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Abstract 
An entirely novel synthesis combines the applied cognitive psychology of a task 
analytic approach with a neural cell assembly perspective that models both brain and 
mind function during task performance; similar cell assemblies could be 
implemented as an artificially intelligent neural network.  A simplified cell assembly 
model is introduced and this leads to several new representational formats that, in 
combination, are demonstrated as suitable for analysing tasks.  The advantages of 
using neural models are exposed and compared with previous research that has used 
symbolic artificial intelligence production systems, which make no attempt to model 
neurophysiology.  For cognitive scientists, the approach provides an easy and 
practical introduction to thinking about brains, minds and artificial intelligence in 
terms of cell assemblies.  In the future, subsequent developments have the potential 
to lead to a new, general theory of psychology and neurophysiology, supported by 
cell assembly based artificial intelligences. 
Keywords: Ergonomics, Cognitive Psychology, Artificial Intelligence, Neuroscience, Task 
Analysis, Artificial Neural Networks, Cell Assemblies. 
 
.1 Introduction 
There already exists a strong relationship between a cognitive ergonomics Task Analysis (TA) 
method and Artificial Intelligence (AI) of the symbolic sort.  These are, respectively, Goals, 
Operations, Methods and Selection rules (GOMS, e.g. Card, Moran and Newell, 1983;  Kieras, 
2004) and production systems such as ACT-R (e.g. Anderson and Lebiere, 1998, Anderson 
2007) and EPIC (Meyer and Kieras, 1997).  Anderson and Lebiere claim that such systems 
“are the only modelling formalism capable of spanning a broad range of tasks, dealing with 
complex cognition …” (p3), and in their enthusiasm go so far as to claim for ATC-R “a 
profound sense of psychological reality” (p13); Anderson (2007) sees EPIC as a precursor to 
ACT-R 6.0, contributing “Perceptual-Motor” modules.  EPIC’s developers are rather more 
cautious in their claims (e.g. Kieras and Meyer, 1994; Meyer and Kieras, 1997).   
A fundamental problem with these production system symbolic AI approaches involves 
“cognitive architecture” which Anderson (2007, p7) defines as “a specification of the structure 
of the brain at a level of abstraction that explains how it achieves the function of the mind.”  
There is a problem concerning his “level of abstraction” notion.  At the level of program code, 
these symbolic AI systems make no attempt to mimic the human brain, other than as functional, 
i.e. psychological, modules, although Anderson (2007) attempts, post hoc, to relate some of 
these to brain areas.  The theoretical issue concerns simulation fidelity, here how well one 
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thing, a symbolic AI, can mimic another, the brain, when at the level of operation they are 
completely different types of thing.  This paper proposes a solution by using a different sort of 
AI, one which does attempt simulation of how both the brain and the mind operates and which 
uses a single, common modelling representation for both. 
There are hundreds of different TA methods and virtually all of them have a cognitive, 
psychological component, although the psychology generally is not that good.  As Kieras 
(2004) rightly notes, “a task analysis for system design must be rather more informal and 
primarily heuristic in flavour compared to scientific research.”  Based on the cognitive 
psychology of Card, Moran and Newell (1980), GOMS is one of the more psychologically 
sophisticated of TA methods yet is easy to criticise as scientifically inadequate.  For example, 
when a task performer needs to access Long Term Memory (LTM), a GOMS analysis can 
identify this but is pretty well independent of alternative theories of human LTM architectures 
and processes, i.e. a GOMS analysis would hardly change whether one modelled human LTM 
like computer backing store, or as memory traces with different strengths, or as multiple traces. 
The basic theoretical argument in GOMS, and generally in TA, is that some cognitive 
representations and processes similar to those identified during an analysis must occur.  For 
example, at some point in a task it might be necessary to store information temporarily, which 
the TA might call using Short Term Memory (STM), but whether this is the STM of Miller 
(1956) is moot, never mind the Baddeley and Hitch (1974, Baddeley, 1976) alternative 
architecture of their Working Memory, which has been considerably developed subsequently, 
e.g. Oberauer et al. (2018), and there are a number of other temporary and buffer like stores 
that are hypothesised to be common in all human minds, although the precise theoretical 
specification of these remain controversial, e.g. Morey, et al. (2018).  Similarly, most TAs will 
identify when decisions are made in tasks, but the cognitive decision making mechanisms are 
left unspecified. 
Given the difficulty of predicting human performance, e.g. for its traditional application of 
training design, GOMS is really very good, although Kieras (2004, Kieras and Butler, 2014) 
are carefully cautious about this, and there are exceptions (e.g. Jorritsma et al., 2015).  While 
no one has ever successfully developed a general task taxonomy, i.e. a specification of sub-
tasks or other task components that, together, could be used to specify any task performed by 
people (e.g. Balbo et al., 2004), GOMS does produce a modular, reusable output that resembles 
program pseudo-code.  Indeed, it is a short, obvious step to implement such generic GOMS 
modules as software tool support to facilitate predicting task performance and, on such coat-
tails, to implement the GOMS model as a symbolic AI.  Given the tight binding between GOMS 
and systems like ACT-R and EPIC, it is unsurprising that they share similar theoretical 
limitations.   
This paper’s proposal involves a modern take (Huyck & Passmore, 2013) on Hebbian Cell 
Assemblies (CAs).  Hebb’s (1949) theory is that concepts are represented in the brain by a 
collection of neurons firing, e.g. there is not a Grandmother Cell that represents one of one’s 
grandmothers, but rather there is a Grandmother CA, a collection of neurons that can fire 
persistently, with or without external stimulus from the environment.  Though Hebb’s 1949 
work predates work on cognitive architecture (Newell, 1990), Hebb’s cognitive architecture is 
elegant and straightforward: each mental representation of a concept is represented in the brain 
as a unique CA., i.e. this is the identity thesis of Smart (2007 for a summary) and of his 
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colleague Ullin (1956); also of the similar, independent work of Feigl (1958) who says of 
mental events, that they “are identical with certain (presumably configurational) aspects of the 
neural processes”.  
CAs are normally implemented as a simplified model of neurons to mimic how the human 
brain might operate.  The main proposal in this paper is that it is possible to model the 
behavioural and cognitive psychology of task performance using a putative CA based brain 
model and, in theory, the same model could be implemented as a CA based AI.  One problem 
for GOMS and ACT-R that a CA approach automatically deals with are memory representation 
issues; Hebb’s theory is one of LTM, i.e. CAs represent the conceptual contents of LTM.  
Attractive if not completely compelling evidence for the CA approach is that like nearly all 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs), CA based ones are self-organising, i.e. they can learn.  
This is the Achilles’ Heel of nearly all symbolic AIs, they need human programmers first.  
Thus, if a GOMS model changes then its symbolic AI equivalent would have to be 
reprogrammed.  Anderson (2007) discusses learning in some detail (e.g. Chapter 5), but it is 
hardly surprising that ACT-R can model human learning since, at least in theory, following a 
TA is should be able to model any task performed by people, including ones involving learning.  
There is, however, a critical difference between being able to model human learning and the 
basic, inherent, inevitable and unstoppable learning that is fundamental to ANNs, including 
CA-based ones. 
The ‘Cell Assembly roBots’ (CABots) demonstrate in a virtual environment the learning of 
both aspects of the environment and new objects within it, and it has a problem solving 
capability, all without the intervention of human programmers (Huyck & Mitchell, 2018).  
While ACT-R, and other cognitive architectures like Soar (Laird et al., 1987) can learn, these 
typically work by parameter setting or generating new rules using old rules.  They are not 
capable of, for instance, symbol grounding (Harnad, 1990).  CAs provide an ability, for 
instance, to ground symbols, suggested as early as Hebb (1949). 
There is considerable evidence, summarised by (Huyck & Passmore, 2013) that much of the 
human brain does use a CA architecture. The Strong CA Hypothesis, that all brain function is 
by CAs, is almost certainly untrue, although specialised brain areas may develop during 
neonatal tuning from a general CA architecture, e.g. Blakemore and Cooper (1970); and that 
cortical plasticity allows some recovery of function after localised brain insult, also might be 
plausibly explained by general purpose CAs becoming tuned in adulthood.  The Weak CA 
Hypothesis, that the brain’s default architecture is CA based, remains plausible.  
On a more cautious note, much of our current understanding of CAs comes from work on 
ANNs.   There is a serious issue of the biological plausibility of such ANNs.  For example, 
while it is now possible to simulate a billion neurons in real time in a system (Furber, et al., 
2013), these artificial neurons are really represented as a rather simple algebraic equation and, 
as such, are an extremely simplified model of the brain’s physiology.  While, for example, 
Huyck’s Fatiguing Leaky Integrate and Fire (FLIF) neurons (Huyck and Parvizi, 2012) are a 
better simulation of brain neurons than early ANNs, e.g. perceptrons (Rumelhard and 
McClelland, 1986), or, earlier, compartmental models (Hodkin and Huxley, 1952), they fail to 
model fundamental neural physiological properties such as spike trains.  Even FLIF neurons 
fail to model basic physiology such as different neurotransmitters, other temporal neuron 
properties, and much else.  
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An absolutely crucial, and it seems sometimes overlooked, property of even quite simple CAs 
is that Byrne & Huyck (2010) have proved that they can be Turing machines, i.e. that, given 
enough neurons, they can compute the result of any legal mathematical or logical expression.  
The critical consequence of this is that anything that can be written using traditional 
programming approaches, including symbolic AI code, can be done using simulated neuron 
based CAs.  At the moment, run-time efficiency remains a major problem, but it is believable 
that performance will continue to improve in the relatively short term future.  On the other 
hand, Huyck’s CABot already runs in real time on a PC. 
Hebb’s original theory has been considerably developed, particularly in recent years.  A simple 
but critical improvement is that Hebb’s concepts have been extended to most mental content 
and, indeed, to representing processes.  On the latter, CAs naturally represent processes as CAs 
change over time, e.g. a grandmother CA is updated during a visit to her, and this is akin to a 
run time process description of computer program code (Osterweil, 1987; Diaper and Kadoda, 
1999).  CAs can also represent processes by providing structure to CAs pre-ignition, for 
example, for doing mental arithmetic, Natural Language (NL) parsing, and for other sorts of 
common problem solving and planning. 
As concepts, Hebb’s CAs can fire persistently over time and this remains a fundamental 
property of newer CA models, although, more accurately, they have the capability of 
persistence because in some tasks this may not be required, e.g. in a self-terminating, visual, 
serial search task the target CA would not persist for long if the target is the first item, but may 
have to persist for minutes in other circumstances.  Critically for the brain, CAs can  be ignited 
for longer than it takes a neuron to fatigue.  Therefore, for CA persistence on the order of 
several seconds and above, there must be a pool of non-firing neurons that can be swapped in 
to replace fatiguing neurons so as to maintain an ignited CA (see PotN, section 2).  
Furthermore, with very long term CA persistence a member neuron might fire, fatigue, recover 
and then re-fire.  Indeed, it is essential that the particular neurons that are firing in an ignited 
CA change over time so that the CA can perform processes, for example, doing a calculation 
(Tetzlaff et al., 2015).  Even when a CA functions as an LTM item, this will change over 
ignitions, even when general learning is slight (see the QPID model below).   
The brain has around 1011 neurons (Smith, 2010) and the size range of ignited CAs has been 
suggested as 103 to 107 neurons  (Huyck and Passmore, 2013), although the upper estimates 
probably refer to “super-CAs composed of many sub-CAs”.  Even with all these brain neurons, 
most neurons will, at different times, have membership of different CAs, although CA type 
may be restricted, e.g. a neuron in the visual cortex might always be involved with visual 
processing, but be in millions of different CAs during its existence.  
In the absence of alternative theories and appropriate physiological evidence, a simple model 
is that CAs can exist in four states: Quiescent, Priming, Ignited, and Decaying.  For simplicity, 
it is assumed that all four states are physiologically similar, i.e. that the Q, P and D states are 
but weaker versions of a CA in the I-state, with fewer neurons but these may still be shared, at 
different times, across numerous CAs.  Functionally, however, the four states may differ 
significantly: Q-state CAs are structured for permanent storage.  The role of CAs in their P-
state is to prepare a CA for ignition and support processes such as attentional mechanisms 
involving competition between CAs.  The reality in brains in undoubtedly very complicated 
and a P-state CA probably has a very different structure at the start of priming to just before 
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ignition as it evolves into a form ready for ignition; it is also possible that CAs may exist in the 
P-state without on some occasions ever igniting.  The D-state is involved with preparing a CA 
for its LTM storage and may be equally as complex in its structures and functions.  The 
physiology and functionality of these transition states is not so much under researched as 
virtually unresearched. 
In a typical QPID cycle the new Q-state is not quite the same as its precursor.  When the 
notionally same CA is ignited on different occasions, not only will these differ as to the set of 
neurons involved in each ignition, but the CA itself will not be quite the same.  Thus, the 
functional definition of a CA must be at a sufficiently high level of description that such 
differences usually can be ignored.  From Scott-Phillips et al. (2011) in the context of their 
distinction between proximate and ultimate explanations in evolutionary theory, it may be that 
functional and physical descriptions are of different types: the physical, brain TACAP models 
being proximate and addressing “How?” questions and the mental, functional ones may be 
ultimate models and addressing a highly specialised epistemological type of “Why?” questions.   
Some concept of levels of description, of detail, is common in many areas of human endeavour.  
The super- and sub-CA proposal and the QPID model fits neatly with the extensive use of the 
levels concept in TA, and with this paper’s CA based approach.  Emphasising that a TA model 
is an analysts’ model and different from that of task participants and other involved parties, 
e.g. managers, (Diaper, 2004 and ibid.), one difficult “judgement call” (Kieras, 2004) is the 
level at which a particular TA is pitched.  Most TA methods involve some form of task 
decomposition into subtasks, and sub-subtasks, down to the level analysts select (N.B. different 
levels may be chosen for different parts of the same task).  Many methods do simply decompose 
tasks, but not all.  For example, the old but still popular Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) 
method (Annett and Duncan, 1967; Annett, 2004) decomposes task goals rather than recorded 
task components.  As such, HTA is an analysis technique that can be used after task data is 
collected and represented.  
This last point about HTA is crucial to this paper, which similarly only discusses an analysis 
technique and not a full TA method.  Traditionally, a TA method early on will involve multiple 
information sources and data collection techniques; observation of performance, interviews 
and questionnaires are common, but many other data sources and techniques have been used 
over the decades.  In nearly all TA methods, whatever data is collected, it is combined to 
produce some sort of Activity List (AL), otherwise known as a ‘task protocol’ (N.B. this is 
different from a ‘task transcript’).   
While varying greatly in style, generally an AL is a prose description of how a task is performed 
and the strong recommendation of Diaper (1989a, 2004, and ibid.) is that an AL should consist 
of a list of short sentences that each describe a task step, at the level chosen, and each line 
should identify a main agent and the action(s) performed towards one or more things (agents 
or objects), perhaps using other things (tools).  It is some such AL representation that HTA and 
this paper’s work uses as input to their analysis techniques.  One word of caution, however, 
data collected with one TA method in mind may not be suitable if other analysis techniques are 
then used; missing data being the most obvious problem, but there are more subtle ones. 
This paper is not proposing yet another TA method or, even, analysis technique, at least, not at 
the moment.  This is one of the reasons why “Perspective” appears in its title.  A perspective 
is “a point of view” and in the scheme of things as used here, is a very general theoretical 
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formulation, perhaps a high level framework.  Within a Popperian (e.g. Popper, 1979) scientific 
epistemology, the claim is that only well specified hypotheses can be experimentally tested and 
that disproof of one does not necessarily disprove the more general framework from which that 
false hypothesis was derived; metaphorically, pruning twigs from a knowledge tree may not 
damage its main branches.   
Perspective, as used in this paper, is a “General Theory of Psychology” (section 5.3.3), perhaps 
akin to cognitive psychology’s one that has the axiom, “The mind is an information processing 
device.”  The claim is that all psychological phenomena can be described and, ultimately, 
explained within the perspective defined by its primary axioms (Diaper and Stanton, 2004).  
As an extension, the CA equivalent would be something like, “The mind and brain are 
information processing devices that both use common, although differently described, cell 
assemblies.” 
Cognitive psychology’s axiom is implementation independent, i.e. it has no constraints on how 
the brain works, its architecture, processes and so forth, because it is only concerned with 
mental models, of information processing.  In contrast, the CA perspective provides for a firm 
cognitive architecture that relates and explains concomitant brain and cognitive function.  This 
and similar issues are more properly and completely covered in the Discussion (section 5.2). 
The version of TACAP that is used in this paper is described in section 2.  There remains, 
however, one further major issue concerning the “Perspective” in the TACAP title. 
TACAP, as used in this paper, deliberately exploits the limitations of TA to provide a 
demonstration of what may be possible and an example of potential utility.  The emphasis is 
that it is only a demonstration and this leads to what at first might seem an odd claim: we do 
not care if everything in the demonstration is wrong. 
It is very likely that none of the brain CAs identified in this paper will ever be found to exist, 
but using the TA defence (see above), something similar must occur, and it remains possible 
that in a training programme based on a TACAP approach, some CAs from the TA will cause 
similar CAs in trainees.  Similarly, the mental, functional TA descriptions provided may also 
all be wrong, but this may also be a matter of poor TA, which is not at all a concern in a 
demonstration.  As for AI, the proposals concerning similarities with brains cannot be worse 
than that for the GOMS to ACT-R/EPIC relationship, howsoever the CAs proposed are wrong 
in detail, since the symbolic systems have no claim to any hardware realism.  What is provided 
in this paper is a demonstration of the potential of a CA based perspective within the practical, 
engineering limitations of TA.   
Before returning to the topics introduced above in the Discussion section (section 5), the 
TACAP version developed (section 2) and its application and the results (sections 3 plus 
Appendix I, and 4, respectively) are reported.  
 
.2 The Task Analysis Cell Assembly Model 
An advantage of this first demonstration using TA and the CA notion is that it can exploit TA’s 
heuristic approach (see Kieras, 2004, quoted above) and, as argued immediately above, as 
applied psychology the description of task performance needs only to be plausible. 
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The following subsections outline the models and representations finally used.  In their 
development a considerable variety of things were tried and rejected, sometimes simply 
because they were just too awkward to use.  Leaving such to historians of science, this paper 
tends to concentrate on what was found successful and relatively easy to use.  One of the biggest 
determinates of the development programme was consistency.  Most TAs are performed 
iteratively and our development work was an extreme example as we would not only return to 
initially analysed task steps and re-analyse them, but sometimes we would even change the 
graphics and notational style to what was found later to be a better approach.  Indeed, 
particularly during the early analysis stages, decisions were made about the nature of the CAs 
and their relationships that quite fundamentally changed the earlier analyses, which had to be 
redone, some of them several times. 
 
.2.1 The Simplified Cell Assembly Model (SCAM) 
The standard, simple graphical representation of a CA plots number of neurons firing against 
time (Kaplan et al., 1991, Huyck and Passmore, 2013).  Unsurprisingly, this graph resembles 
that of an individual neuron’s firing and, indeed, most negative feedback systems.   
The lifecycle of a simple CA is: (a) there is a background level of neuron firing (quite a lot in 
the brain, but it is not organised, section 4.2.3); (b) a CA starts to develop, usually due to 
“priming” from already ignited CAs, and the number of neurons firing in the CA starts to 
increase, probably in an exponential manner (N.B. competition between a number of alternative 
CAs at this stage may be a critical part of autonomous cognitive decision making and 
attentional mechanisms); (c) sufficient neurons fire such that the CA’s “threshold” is reached; 
(d) at which point a large number of neurons rapidly join the CA which then “ignites”; (e) as 
with most negative feedback systems, there is an overshoot as firing neuron CA membership 
climbs to its ignition state; (f) after the overshoot the function stabilises at a level which may 
be several times higher than threshold; (g) the CA then persists and there is a slow decay in the 
number of neurons firing to support the ignited CA, due to neuron fatigue, if nothing else; (h) 
at some point the CA will extinguish, either because there are insufficient neurons firing to 
maintain ignition, or because the CA becomes inhibited by the firing of other CAs; (i) the CA’s 
neuron activity drops below threshold and the CA decays, although what it decays to may 
depend on the type and context of a CA, i.e. it may decay to background levels, or have a 
refractory period like neurons and be harder to re-ignite, or it may remain above background 
so that it is primed for re-ignition (sections 4.2.3 and 5.3.1). 
Many CAs will be more complicated than this simple model, particularly ones that persist for 
long periods, minutes if not hours, as fatigued neurons are replaced.  All sorts of things might 
change during a CAs persistence phase (g) due to CA competition, cooperation and, even, 
combination or division.  Thus, this part of the model might present a saw tooth profile rather 
than a relatively smooth decline in the number of neurons firing in an ignited CA; for example, 
see Appendix I: CA 06 MSHWA – Motor Stride to Hot Water Area. 
The Simplified Cell Assembly Model (SCAM) is shown in Figure 1 and each CA is represented 
as a single dimension array consisting of a unique identifier (ID) and eight parameters, four 
relating to number of neurons and four to elapsed time.  We have not modelled the overshoot 
(f) because we have no idea as to its function, if it has one.  Also, because so little is known or 
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even theorised about background levels, priming and decay, this part of the SCAM is simplified 
to two parameters (P50% and D50%).   
 
Figure 1 The SCAM diagram.  The four lower parameters are measures of time and the four 
floating ones are measures of neuron numbers. 
 
The four SCAM parameters associated with number of neurons are: 
PotN – the potential number of neurons that could have membership of the CA; 
Thresh – the threshold at which there are sufficient neurons firing to cause CA ignition; 
IgMax – the maximum number of neurons that fire at CA ignition; 
IgFat – the number of firing neurons after neuron fatigue at the end of CA ignition, i.e. 
at CA extinction. 
N.B. In some cases IgFat may equal Thresh, in which case the CA will then decay, but in other 
cases the CA may be supressed so that at CA extinction IgFat > Thresh, as shown in the SCAM 
diagram. 
The four SCAM parameters associated with time are: 
P50% - the time at which a CA is primed to 50% of the neurons firing that are required 
to reach its ignition threshold; 
IgTIg – an ignited CA’s time of ignition; 
IgTEx – an ignited CA’s time of extinction;  
D50%  – the  time at which a CA decays to 50% of the neurons that were firing at CA 
extinction (IgFat). 
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Even within the limited demonstration analysis, across CAs there is a considerable range of 
shapes to the SCAM diagrams and each of the eight parameters have some variation.  This is 
desirable and if it were not so then a parameter could be treated as a constant. 
For each CA identified, values for each parameter have to be estimated and while this is 
relatively straightforward from observational data for the four time parameters, those 
associated with the number of neurons may be wild guestimates.  Far too little is known about 
brain CAs and the guestimates may be in error by an order of magnitude or two.  On the other 
hand, generally the expectation is that errors will be consistent, so subsequent corrections based 
on new research might fix such errors by multiplying by a simple equation, or even just a 
constant.  Explanations for choosing parameters for individual CAs are included in the main 
analysis (Appendix I). 
While a crucial analysis component, with practice the SCAM diagrams became quite easy to 
visualise and their main representation during analysis was in the SCAM table. 
 
.2.2 The SCAM Table 
Each identified CA is represented as a line in the SCAM table using the CA’s unique identifier 
and the eight SCAM parameters.  Table 1 shows the first few lines of  the main analysis. 
No. ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTI
g 
IgTEx D50% ID Acronym 
01 CKEC 10 2 7 6 -1.0 0.0 0.4 0.5 COG Kitchen Entrance Check  
02 VKEG 20 10 15 14 -0.8 0.1 0.3 0.4 VIS Kitchen Entrance General 
03 CMC 5 1 2 1.5 -1.0 0.4 2.5 4.0 COG Make Coffee 
Table 1  Example lines from the main analysis’ SCAM table (Table 2). 
While perhaps not ergonomically optimised, once one can visualise SCAM diagrams then the 
SCAM table becomes one of  the three critical analysis tools. For example, the task timeline as 
represented by the ignition and extinction of each CA (IgTIg and IgTEx, respectively) can be 
seen by simply running down the table’s two columns for these parameters.   
The SCAM table had many uses during analysis and was crucial for iteration during analysis 
and for maintaining consistency and for error checking.  Such roles are particularly important 
because of the complexity of another main analysis representation, the Cell Assembly 
Architecture Relationship (CAAR) diagram. 
 
.2.3 The Cell Assembly Architecture Relationship (CAAR) Diagram 
The tidiness of the CAAR diagram shown in the results of the main analysis (Figure 9) belies 
its origins, which were pages of handwritten scrappy notes and diagrams.  The basic procedure 
was to identify the next potential, small set of CAs that together would represent a cognitive 
task step.  The possible inputs would have been identified during analysis of CAs earlier in the 
task and then the relationship between the CAs being analysed would be worked out; finally, 
the possible outputs would be identified. 
In the CAAR diagram each CA identified is represented by a box and the relationships between 
CAs, i.e. how one CA ignites, maintains or supresses another, and what information is passed 
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between CAs during their ignition, are represented by arrows.  CA priming and decay also need 
to be considered. 
The CAAR diagram has elapsed task time, approximately within graphical constraints, 
increasing vertically downward.  Horizontally, CAs are arranged by type, from left to right: 
Perceptual; Cognitive; and Motor.  The perceptual CAs are further subdivided as being Visual, 
Touch and Kinaesthetic ones   These CA types always represent the first character of each CA’s 
ID, i.e. V/T/K, C, or M. 
Figure 2 shows a generic CAAR diagram.  It is the template for the pattern that was the most 
commonly found in the main analysis (section 4.3).   
 
 
Figure 2 Generic CAAR Diagram. 
 
In its present form the CAAR diagram shows only a limited amount of the information that it 
could contain.  Iteration between CAs, e.g. where each of a pair is helping to maintain the other, 
is a critical property that is shown in neither diagrammatic or tabular representation; in the 
rough, hand drawn diagrams multiple arrow heads were used to show such iteration.  Further 
possible refinements are left to the Discussion (section 5.3.1), although the reason why the 
CAAR acronym includes “Architecture” is that it is all the considered but currently 
unrepresented aspects of each CA, and how it relates to others that is architectural and 
potentially puts it beyond just a set of 1960s cognitive psychology style boxes and arrows.  
Description and explanation of many of these factors is included in the text associated with 
each CA in the full main analysis (Appendix I).  Further description of the TACAP analysis 
techniques’ method is in section 3.2. 
 
.3 The ‘First Steps to Making Coffee’ Example  
It all started as a very quick investigation after the inspiration to join the TA and CA concepts.  
After a few days it became clear that the whole TACAP analysis enterprise would require 
considerable, long term, effort.  There were weeks of trial and error as everything from the 
basic concepts, the notations, and the graphics had to be worked out.  For example, at least half 
a dozen diagram styles were tried before developing the SCAM diagrams used in this paper; 
there were similar graphical problems with the CAAR diagram; and the SCAM table had to be 
reformatted a number of times as the eight SCAM parameters were themselves developed.  In 
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the end, just nine seconds of expert task behaviour was analysed, and it takes over sixty CAs 
to do so. 
 
.3.1 Task Selection and Data Collection Method 
We appreciate the view of those who think that never again should there be a TA paper that 
uses the making_a_hot_beverage example.  In our defence, the CA perspective is novel, so, on 
practical grounds, it is reasonable to choose an extremely familiar task, indeed, probably the 
one most commonly chosen to introduce students to TA.  Furthermore, the demonstration 
analysis, in time, is rather short, so there is not much coffee making to worry the cognoscenti. 
Data was collected using a repeated trials, self-observation, post sub-task recording, heuristic 
approach, i.e. the first author, who is a TA expert (hence “heuristic”), watched himself, many 
times (more than thirty) doing the first part of his making coffee routine and then making 
written notes after each trial.  During some of the trials timing data (to the nearest 0.1 seconds) 
was recorded at two points during the task using a small mobile phone’s digital stopwatch held 
in the left hand (section 4.1).  The initial observations took place over several days and 
additional trials were done over the following month during the first stages of the main analysis. 
Against any objections to this heuristic method, there are a number of advantages for what, we 
keep stressing, is only a demonstration of a possible analysis technique and not a new TA 
method.  First, the task is a very highly practiced one, with a history of over 20 years in the 
current house and unchanged after about half a dozen years since the kitchen was remodelled. 
Second, its nigh invariant repeatability allowed access to renewed observations when they were 
needed, and they were.  For example, the subject was unaware and failed to initially record 
what happened to the left hand while the kettle, grasped in the right, was moved to the sink for 
filling.  Third, the subject was already expert at such self-observation because, using his TA 
expertise, he continuously works at prosaic task optimisation, ideally with an end result that he 
can continue to think of other things while performing the common and mundane.  Thus, the 
data collection approach adopted provided high quality data, indeed, much higher quality than 
from most TAs that involve analysts recording the performance of other people. 
As a further defence, the subject-analyst discovered new details of how he performed the task 
of which he was previously unaware, for example, the pattern of steps taken outside and across 
the kitchen (section 3.3.2), as well as the example of the empty left hand’s actions mentioned 
above.  At the least, this demonstrates that a TA was done and that the demonstration is not 
based merely on a desktop, thought-experiment exercise. 
The three other residents in the house were also observed doing the same kettle filling task (see 
Appendix I: CA 06 MSHWA – Motor Stride to Hot Water Area) which, at least, demonstrated 
that a more traditional TA with subject and analyst separate was feasible. 
 
.3.2 Analysis Method 
The AL resulting from the data collected was very simple and along the lines: enter kitchen; 
go to hot drinks preparation area; grip kettle in right hand; move kettle over sink; remove kettle 
lid with left hand; invert kettle to empty it; replace lid with left hand; move kettle under water 
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spout; fill kettle.  As soon as the analysis started, each such AL line was rapidly elaborated, 
often supported by further task observations, and soon the ordered list of identified CAs 
effectively became the AL used for further analysis.   
At this early stage of research it is not feasible to provide a detailed method for the TACAP 
analysis technique, and it is undesirable to do so.  Method specification in TA is extremely 
difficult, to the extent that Diaper (2001) suggests that it is necessary to develop analyst support 
software to support method specification.  While such tools’ superficial, primary function is to 
make analysis easier and less error prone, to teach and guide a neophyte analyst requires 
supporting software to have an explicit and detailed model of the method.  The discipline 
required of programming means ready identification of missing and, much more frequently, 
underspecified parts of a method, which expert analysts bridge using their craft skills, often 
without being aware they are doing so.  Indeed, HTA is often described as a “methodology” 
and its massive under-specification is seen as an advantage, for the experts who have served 
their apprenticeship.   
Once the TACAP analysis technique settled down during the latter two thirds of the analysis, 
it was all done online, indeed, as if there was software tool support and with the analyst having 
the role for the desirable but missing program code.  Of course there was a lot of printing for 
off-line checking and editing, but during analysis the only paper was a couple of very scrappy 
sheets with a hand drawn version of the CAAR diagram, and a lot of annotations, crossings 
out, etc.  On-screen, centred was the main analysis document (Word); to the left was the SCAM 
table (Word) and to the right the CAAR diagram (PowerPoint).  The acronym glossary 
(Appendix II) was also always available.  Usually, a small set of CAs would be analysed as a 
group, the most common pattern being that shown in Figure 2 (Section 2.3).   
The first step was to create an entry for each CA in the main document and to copy and paste 
(to minimise typographic errors) the ID and spelled out acronym into the glossary, and the ID 
into the SCAM table.  As an example of cognitive architecture, the default is that at least one, 
already analysed, input will go to the new cognitive CA.  There may be more than one known, 
analysed input, and during analysis, occasionally, there is a floating output, where an earlier 
CA must have this, but the analyst was not sure of its still unanalysed destination CA.  Note, it 
is only a default, but with the advantage that exceptions, and there are some, are bought to the 
analyst’s attention for especial consideration.  It is an example of architecture in that other 
defaults could have been chosen, for example, making perceptual CAs the default and have 
some sort of Perception – Cognition – Motor cycle or left–then–right scan, i.e. P_C_M_P_C… 
or P_C_M_C_P_C…, respectively.  The TACAP default model is more of a tree with C usually 
mediating between P and M, i.e. C_P_C_P… & C_M_C_M… .  There are positive and 
negative arguments for any of these architectures, but they are all only defaults and the analysis 
allows alternatives, for example when perceptual and motor systems become tightly bound in 
some expert behaviours (section 4.3). 
Once the new CA set’s inputs have been cut and pasted to the tabular entries in the main 
document, then each CA is described as text (Appendix I) and the relationships between the 
CAs are added during writing the text, i.e. when a CA has an output to another member in the 
set being analysed, then the output is copy and pasted as input to the appropriate CA.  This is 
just the sort of thing an analyst’s support tool would do automatically.  Also, while writing the 
text, the SCAM table is gradually filled in.  In most cases the values assigned to entries in the 
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SCAM table are explained in the Appendix I text, while attempting to avoid too much 
repetition.  The order in which data was entered to the SCAM table was driven by the linear 
sequencing of the natural language text.  After the first few CAs were analysed the SCAM 
diagrams were not drawn simply because the analyst could visualise them from the SCAM 
table and each diagram took quite some time to produce, which would have interfered with the 
main analysis processes; a trivial software tool is needed to draw the SCAM diagrams 
automatically from the table. 
At the end of a CA’s writing process, the outputs to yet unanalysed CAs will be entered.  This 
text will be what is copy and pasted when it is the turn of these CAs to be analysed.  This led 
to inserting some new IDs in the SCAM table ahead of their analysis. 
A further feature of the Input/Output tabular specifications in the main analysis (Appendix I) 
is their punctuation.  No punctuation between lines means that the two inputs or outputs occur 
in parallel and increasing punctuation strength, i.e. comma, and though rarely used in the main 
analysis (Appendix I), semicolon and colon, show increasing separation in time; a full stop 
indicates the termination of one input or output before the start of another, although both are 
within the main analysis’ description of a particular CA.  Checking the punctuation at the end 
of analysing a set of CAs was an important part of the error checking routines. 
Unlike the SCAM diagrams, it was found important to regularly update the CAAR diagram 
during analysis.  This was no simple transposition from its very rough paper representation to 
its accurate computer version.  The CAAR diagram is a triumph of graphic design in that it 
shows over sixty CAs and their relationships in way that can be printed on a single sheet of A4 
paper, without sacrificing readability.  Many designs were tried and some of the earliest would 
have needed a dozen or so pages rather than just one.  Furthermore, because it was prepared in 
PowerPoint, the analyst’s default graphical editor for decades, it is actually quite easy to 
animate the diagram (Appendix III).  This is returned to in the Discussion (sections 5.1 and 
5.3.1). 
On the other hand, using PowerPoint was a bit of a pig, even for a real expert, as the small scale 
pushed PowerPoint’s resolution when drawing the arrows.  It was essential to keep the CAAR 
diagram up to date, no matter that it was time consuming to do.  When there was iteration in 
the analysis, returning and modifying CAs already analysed, then the CAAR diagram, the 
SCAM table and the main text’s tabular specifications were always changed together.  Usually, 
changing one analysed CA resulted in changing other ones as well. 
The method adopted was designed to minimise error and facilitate error checking, e.g.  every 
output must have its input, in the architecture, to another CA, which shows one of the chosen 
simplifications, not modelling the internal processes of a CA (section 2.1).  It is necessary to 
check that every CA is correctly represented in each of the four main representations: the main 
analysis document, the CAAR diagram, the SCAM table and the SCAM diagrams.  Especial 
care needs taking where previously analysed CAs have been changed by dividing or combining 
them as this will likely to have changed their IDs, which is the key identifier in all the main 
representations.  The acronym glossary (Appendix II) was only updated occasionally once the 
analyst had learned his own acronymic CA IDs, and he used them all the time when reasoning 
about relationships between CAs. 
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.3.3 Analysis Introduction 
Subsections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 are intended to provide an introduction to the task and a flavour of 
the style used in the full main analysis in Appendix I.  Subsection 3.3.3 contains a strong 
recommendation to readers that, before they read the results in section 4, that they familiarise 
themselves with some of main analysis in Appendix I and with the main representations used. 
 
.3.3.1 The Coffee Making Decision 
Prior to the start of the analysis in the kitchen, the subject has made the decision to make a 
small mug of coffee. This decision could be based on many things, from habit or time since 
last coffee, or thirst or other dehydration indicators, or just the need for a break, and so forth.  
Numerous CAs will have been involved in making this decision, but a critical issue is what one 
or more cognitive CAs are primed or already ignited at the kitchen’s entrance.  There may be 
intervening activities so that the time from making the decision to arriving at the kitchen 
entrance might be five or more minutes. 
One possible model would involve the decision making CAs igniting a coffee making one that 
would persist until task completion.  One could even suggest that this CA would contain a plan 
of what is involved in making a small mug of coffee.  There is some evidence that this model 
is not that plausible.  First, with intervening tasks then such a CA would have to persist, ignited, 
while many other CAs are deployed.  Furthermore, the make coffee CA might just be part of a 
list of tasks to complete and such a dynamic task list CA would have complex behaviours as 
tasks are completed and, sometimes, the list order might be shuffled, some tasks deleted or 
postponed, and so forth.  Note, arguments involving consciousness are weak to irrelevant, e.g. 
that people do not perform loads of intervening tasks while thinking “must make a coffee, must 
make a coffee, must …”. 
At a minimum, when the coffee making decision is made then a ‘Make Coffee’ CA must be 
ignited as a record of the decision.  This CA can be of modest size as the decision record and, 
if one chooses, one could call it a “goal”.  There is evidence that this CA does not remain 
ignited in the widely reported phenomenon of one going to a room and then realising one cannot 
remember why one went there, i.e. the CA fails to reignite in its now appropriate context. 
In the analysis that follows, the assumption is that the CA ‘Make Coffee’ has been previously 
ignited and remains sufficiently primed that it will reignite with suitable environmental input, 
e.g. from vision.  The analysis starts at the kitchen entrance and the evidence suggests that the 
host of go-to-the-kitchen CAs that brought the subject to this spot all close down.  This is 
suggested by the final kitchen entrance approach behaviour described in the next subsection. 
 
.3.3.2 Before the Kitchen’s Entrance 
Before the kitchen entrance there is a shuffle zone.  The following observations are a direct 
consequence of the research reported in this paper.  The kitchen entrance has no door and there 
are four routes to arrive at the entrance, from North West to South East withershins 
respectively: corridor, stairs, lean-to, and lounge (Figure 3).  Whichever route the subject takes 
to the kitchen entrance, he always arrives with his right foot planted in the centre of the kitchen 
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entrance, that foot may be over the entrance’s low, wooden floor bar, or the whole foot, up to 
a couple of centimetres clear, in front of or behind the bar (Figure 4B), but the right foot is 
always aligned at a right angle to the entrance’s bar and at the centre of the entrance.  Indeed, 
experiments requiring the left foot to be the kitchen entering step result in noticeably clumsy 
initial steps within the kitchen and the body, moving at a reasonable domestic speed, is 
unbalanced (e.g. balancing arm movements, hip and upper body twists and similar ergonomic 
inefficiencies).  The right foot entrance is achieved by a shuffle in the area outside the kitchen, 
particularly easy to observe as, when necessary, a half step will be taken when coming down 
the corridor, and also, after descending the stairs, where although either foot may have started 
at the top, steps are adjusted in the shuffle zone.  The shuffle zone is less clear from the lean-
to because usually its door is closed before taking steps towards the kitchen entrance, but 
rationally a shuffle must exist because the right foot is inevitably correctly placed, as it is from 
the lounge, which requires a complex, short curved route of about 130 degrees so shuffling is 
again less easily observed. 
 
Figure 3– The “Shuffle Zone” outside the kitchen entrance. 
 
3.3.3  Further Context 
Rarely is “a picture worth a thousand words”, which is, say, well into three typed sheets of A4.  
To cater for a divers readership, however, what is  offered a quick, photographic story, 
hopefully, to help both task visualisation and comprehension.  Just a bit from the first few 
seconds … 
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Figure 4 (A) The kitchen entrance; (B) The “strides” across the kitchen: right foot in 
green; left in red. 
 
These photographs were taken opportunistically and the kitchen is “as found”, without any 
prior preparation, or any tidying.  Figure 4A shows the kitchen’s ground geography, for 
illustration, but note the top of the photograph and the important context and focus of visual 
attention, already getting ready for kettle identification. 
Figure 4B shows the “invariant” strides from the entrance to the hot water preparation area 
(Appendix I, CA 04 CAHWA to CA 06 MSHWA).  The left foot, in red, takes the first and 
third strides and on the photograph the precision of foot placement is roughly represented by 
the shading.  The right foot (shown in green) launches the strides and, from the shuffle zone 
(section 3.3.2), the foot may be before or over the bar on the entrance’s floor.  The next right 
foot stride is fairly precisely placed but with the left foot very accurately and correctly located, 
the right foot then makes a forward and then curving motion to locate the feet closely adjacent 
and, concomitantly, the whole body, well balanced in a tight corner space, where it is expertly 
placed.  The visual and cognitive systems, however, are primarily concerned with the hot drinks 
preparation area, and how to pick up the kettle. 
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Figure 5 General view of the kitchen.  Figure 6 View of the hot water preparation area. 
Figure 5 shows the general view of the kitchen, say about midstride on the right foot (see 
above).  The target is the kettle, but there are potential obstacles to its left and right.  The coffee 
filter cone to the left is where it usually is, but the draining board to the right often presents 
novel problems when not empty. 
Figure 6 shows the view once at the hot water preparation area.  Binocular vision is an asset 
here, for detecting that the steel sieve handle to the right of the kettle is in front of it; and there 
is a lot of leftward lean on the translucent plate. 
 
 
Figure 7  The views from the hands’ locations approaching the hot water 
preparation area: (A) right hand; (B) left hand.  
 
Fifty centimetres or so below the eyes, the view from the hands is rather different, and Figure 
7 presents the start of the “flight path” views: 7A shows about where the right hand starts its 
final approach to the kettle and what it has to navigate (obviously some climb is essential); 7B 
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shows the left hand’s “view” and its target will later be somewhere around the black tile, 
catching up with the top of the kettle after it has been lifted (Appendix I: CA 33 MLHTKL). 
 
 
Figure 8  View of the target kettle in the hot water preparation area.  
 
Moving the right hand to the, exactly identified, kettle handle without error, i.e. with no contact 
with any other objects, and, also, smoothly, curvaceously, etcetera, is a behavioural triumph.  
At this range the angle between the point of view in Figure 8 and the right hand’s flight path 
(Figure 7A) is, in computational terms, impressive, massive, etc.  On the other hand, it is just 
what CAs are so neat at describing, explaining and, even, is expected of them because they are 
flexible and capable, by themselves, of learning.  The right hand is under visual negative 
feedback control, but it is typical of expert performance that only little control compensation 
is required from the planned motor output (N.B. this “planned” output in CA terms is just the 
initially ignited CA that, while ignited, evolves with sensory feedback, and other relevant 
inputs, and, perhaps its own temporal structure, i.e. as a process – see Introduction). 
 
3.3.4  The Main Analysis 
It is only for reasons of space that the main analysis is Appendix I and none of it is here in the 
main body of the paper.  Section 4’s “Results” are a high level description of the analysis, but 
in one sense the real results reported in the paper is the main analysis itself.   
A completely new analysis technique has been developed and to understand the paper it is 
necessary for readers to have some understanding of the technique in application and the issues 
that were considered when assigning parameters to the SCAM table and relationships in the 
CAAR diagram.  The issues considered include various psychological aspects and some basic 
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neuroscience because the SCAM table, and the whole analysis, like other TAs, is performer 
centred and so the estimates of CA properties, size and so forth, relate to the human brain and 
not to possible ANN CA implementations (section 5.3.2).  Although, as stated in the 
Introduction, if the estimates are in error by even a couple of orders of magnitude, then at this 
stage we are not at all concerned; it could be easily corrected by further research. 
The main results in Appendix I contains graphical, tabular and textual descriptions of over sixty 
CAs.  First time readers are strongly recommended to examine the first few CA descriptions 
(the fourth ‘Cognitive Approach Hot Water Area (CAHWA)’, is where the analysis starts to 
settle down after the first few analysed task steps).  The initial descriptions tend to be longer 
and more descriptive and later ones rather briefer; and somethings are not repeatedly 
mentioned. 
It is essential to consider the main analysis in Appendix I in conjunction with the SCAM table 
and the CAAR diagram, which are produced below in Table 2 and Figure 9.   
 
No. ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% ID Acronym 
01 CKEC 10 2 7 6 -1.0 0.0 0.4 0.5 COG Kitchen Entrance Check  
02 VKEG 20 10 15 14 -0.8 0.1 0.3 0.4 VIS Kitchen Entrance General 
03 CMC 5 1 2 1.5 -1.0 0.4 2.5 4.0 COG Make Coffee 
04 CAHWA 10 2 5 3 0.5 0.6 3.1 3.2 COG Approaching Hot Water Area 
05 VAHWA 20 2 10 6 0.6 0.7 2.5 2.6 VIS Approaching Hot Water Area 
06 MSHWA 10 2 7 6 0.6 0.7 3.0 3.1 MOT Stride to Hot Water Area 
07 CKHWA 10 3 7 6 0.8 1.0 2.1 2.2 COG Kettle Hot Water Area 
08 VKHWA 20 5 10 9 1.2 1.3 2.0 2.1 VIS Kettle Hot Water Area 
09 CKH 5 1 3 2 1.5 1.6 3.5 3.6 COG Kettle Handle 
10 VKH 10 3 7 6 1.6 1.8 3.3 3.4 VIS Kettle Handle 
11 MRAB 5 1 2 2 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 MOT Right Arm Ballistic 
12 VRH 15 2 5 4 2.0 2.1 3.2 3.3 VIS Right hand 
13 CRH 12 3 7 6 2.1 2.2 3.4 3.5 COG Right hand 
14 CHWA 15 5 10 8 2.2 2.4 3.5 3.7 COG Hot water Area 
15 CRHA 25 5 15 12 2.3 2.5 3.6 3.7 COG Right Hand Approach 
16 VRHA 25 10 15 14 2.3 2.6 3.3 3.4 VIS Right Hand Approach 
17 MRHA 10 2 7 6 2.4 2.7 3.7 3.8 MOT Right Hand Approach 
18 TRHKH 5 2 3 2 3.0 3.5 3.8 3.9 TOU Right Hand to Kettle Handle 
19 CRHG 5 2 3 2 3.2 3.7 3.8 4.2 COG Right Hand Grip 
20 MRHG 5 1 3 2 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.0 MOT Right Hand Grip 
21 TRHG 5 1 3 2 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.3 TOU Right Hand Grip 
22 CRHH 10 2 5 5 3.8 4.0 - - COG Right Hand Hold 
23 MRHH 10 2 3 3 3.9 4.1 - - MOT Right Hand Hold 
24 CLK 10 3 6 5 4.0 4.2 4.7 4.8 COG Lift Kettle 
25 MLK 5 1 3 2 4.1 4.3 4.4 4.5 MOT Lift Kettle 
26 KKW 5 1 3 3 4.2 4.4 4.5 4.6 KIN Kettle Weight 
27 VLK 10 3 6 5 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.7 VIS Lift Kettle 
28 CD 15 5 8 6 4.5 4.6 6.0 6.1 COG Drainer 
29 VD 25 8 15 13 4.6 4.7 5.5 5.8 VIS Drainer 
30 CMKS 25 5 15 12 4.7 4.8 6.6 6.7 COG Move Kettle Sink 
31 VMKS 15 5 10 9 4.8 4.9 6.5 6.6 VIS Move Kettle Sink 
32 MMKS 20 5 10 9 4.9 5.0 6.5 6.6 MOT Move Kettle Sink 
33 MLHTKL 15 3 9 6 5.0 5.1 7.0 7.0 MOT Left Hand Track Kettle Lid 
34 KLHTKL 10 2 6 5 5.1 5.2 7.8 7.8 KIN Left Hand Track Kettle Lid 
35 MSBS 10 5 7 6 5.1 5.3 6.9 7.0 MOT Shuffle Body Sink 
36 CS 5 2 4 3 6.5 6.7 - - COG Sink 
37 VS 10 5 7 6 6.6 6.8 - - VIS Sink 
38 CLHRKL 5 1 4 3 6.8 6.9 7.2 7.3 COG Left Hand Remove Kettle Lid 
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39 VKL 10 5 7 6 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.2 VIS Kettle Lid 
40 VLH 10 5 7 6 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.2 VIS Left Hand 
41 MLHRKL 7 2 6 5 7.0 7.1 7.7 7.7 MOT Left Hand Remove Kettle Lid 
42 VKWL 10 5 7 6 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 VIS Kettle Without Lid 
43 CEK 5 1 4 3 7.1 7.2 7.4 7.5 COG Empty Kettle 
44 MRHIK 3 1 2 2 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.4 MOT Right Hand Invert Kettle 
45 VKE 10 3 5 5 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 VIS Kettle Empty 
46 CKE 3 1 2 2 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.6 COG Kettle Empty 
47 CRHOK 5 1 4 3 7.5 7.6 7.8 7.9 COG Right Hand Orientate Kettle 
48 VRHOK 10 5 7 6 7.5 7.6 7.9 8.0 VIS Right Hand Orientate Kettle 
49 MRHOK 3 1 2 2 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 MOT Right Hand Orientate Kettle 
50 CRKLLH 8 3 6 5 7.8 7.9 8.2 8.3 COG Replace Kettle Lid Left Hand 
51 VRKLLH 10 5 7 6 7.8 7.9 8.2 8.3 VIS Replace Kettle Lid Left Hand 
52 MRKLLH 10 3 7 6 7.9 8.0 8.1 8.2 MOT Remove Kettle Lid Left Hand 
53 CMKT 15 5 10 9 8.1 8.2 - - COG Move Kettle Tap 
54 VT 10 3 5 5 8.2 8.3 8.6 8.7 VIS Tap 
55 VK 15 5 8 7 8.2 8.3 - - VIS Kettle 
56 MMKT 15 5 10 8 8.3 8.4 8.6 8.6 MOT Move Kettle Tap 
57 MHKT 6 1 3 3 8.4 8.5 - - MOT Hold Kettle Tap 
58 CMLHTS 15 7 10 8 8.3 8.5 8.9 9.0 COG Move Left Hand Tap Switch 
59 VLHTS 20 5 10 7 8.5 8.6 - - VIS Left Hand to Tap Switch 
60 VTS 10 5 7 6 8.6 8.7 - - VIS Tap Switch 
61 MMLHTS 15 5 8 7 8.7 8.7 8.9 9.0 MOT Move Left Hand Tap Switch 
62 TLHTS 8 2 6 5 8.7 8.8 - - TOU Left Hand Tap Switch 
63 CFK  10 3 7 6 8.8 8.9 - - COG Fill Kettle 
64 MPTSU 5 1 3 3 8.9 9.0 - - MOT Pull Tap Switch Up 
65 CMC …         COG Make Coffee 
 
Table 2 – The SCAM table. 
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Figure 9– The CAAR Diagram. 
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.4 Results 
Everything in this results section is potentially nothing more than analyst artefacts.  What these 
results present are the consequences of the decisions made by the analyst at a lower level of 
analysis, i.e. these results are the collective description of applying the TACAP analysis 
technique.  Furthermore, and particularly because the analysis was iterative and decision 
consistency was a primary concern, then patterns in the data presented here have sometimes 
been deliberately imposed during analysis.  For example, thresholds will tend to be larger with 
the larger CAs (PotN) so any correlation between the two is deliberate and therefore rather 
uninteresting.  
On the other hand, at the very least these results demonstrate that the analysis has been applied 
in a tidy and consistent manner.  They also give an insight into the detail and complexity of 
analysing at the low levels chosen, and hint at what more complete and relevant task examples 
would require. 
 
.4.1 Time Results 
Timing data to the nearest 0.1 seconds was collected over several days using the stopwatch 
function on a mobile ‘phone.  From the kitchen entrance, data was collected from two easily 
identified steps in the task: (i) when the kettle handle is gripped and ready for the kettle’s lift 
from its base (CA 23 –  MRHH); and (ii) at the end of the analysed task portion when the kettle 
starts to fill (CA 64 – MPTSU). According to the main analysis, these times were 4.1 seconds 
and 9 seconds, respectively. 
Time data is nearly always a problem in TAs, as it was in this study.  As illustration of TAs 
typical problems with time data, the first measure at MRHH had a recorded range of 3.3 – 4.2 
seconds.  The first problem is that a first opportunity sample would tend to be around 4 seconds 
but if repeated half a dozen times then the times would decrease to around the 3.5 second mark, 
i.e. even highly practiced performance improves with several goes at the same task.  Secondly, 
if only first times are considered then there is still half a second of variability, much of which 
depends on the state of the drainer and the concomitant complexity of the right hand’s flight 
path to the kettle handle (section 3.3.3). 
Generally, time data is far less important than sequence data in most TAs and it is one more 
craft skill of analysts to give a single time estimate to each task step.  The estimates in the main 
analysis are, in this tradition, mostly interpolated, approximately correct and on the higher side 
of the range of times recorded. 
 
.4.2 SCAM Results 
There were 64 CAs identified in the main analysis: 34.4% (22/64) were cognitive; 39.1% 
(25/64) were perceptual; and 26.6% (17/64) motor. Of the perceptual CAs, 31.3% (20/64) were 
visual and there were 5 other perceptual CAs: 4.7% (3/64) touch and 3.1% (2/64) kinaesthetic. 
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The general, as an average (arithmetic mean), CA from the main analysis can be drawn, as can 
the SCAM models for the three main types of CA: cognitive, visual and motor.  To do so, the 
five non-visual sensory CAs (3 x touch, 2 x kinaesthetic) and those CAs that are still ignited at 
the end of the analysis, were removed from the data, leaving 48 CAs on which the following 
analysis is based.  Table 3 gives such average data. 
 
CA Type PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg  IgTEx  D50%   
All 11.1 3.3 6.8 5.7 4.5 4.7 5.4 5.5 
Cognitive 10.4 2.8 6.6 5.2 3.8 4.1 5.0 5.2 
Visual 14.4 5.0 8.6 7.5 4.5 4.7 5.3 5.4 
Motor 9.5 2.6 5.9 4.9 5.3 5.4 6.1 6.2 
Table 3  Average data for the 8 SCAM parameters. 
 
The four time metrics (in italics in Table 3) require a little manipulation before they can be 
used to draw versions of the SCAM diagrams.  The details of this are included below because 
they provide an example of suboptimal analysis technique design, which is addressed in the 
Discussion (section 5.3.1). 
The time parameters (t0 – t3) in Table 4 are calculated to correspond to the start of a CA, i.e. 
t0 = 0.0 seconds, and the priming time to ignition (t1), the duration of the ignition until 
extinction (t2), and the decay to zero (t3).   
Since P50% is the time at which there is 50% of the neurons firing to reach threshold, then, for 
graphical purposes, the simplified linear priming in the SCAM requires P50% to be doubled 
for the average time to ignition, after subtracting from the data’s time of ignition (IgTIg), i.e. 
t1 = (IgTIg – P50%) x 2 
The time a CA is ignited (t2) is simply the difference between its extinction minus its ignition 
time, with the elapsed priming time added for graphical purposes, i.e. 
 t2 = (IgTEx – IgTIg) + t1  
As with t1, the full elapsed decay time requires D50% to be doubled, after subtraction from the 
extinction time (IgTEx), and then the elapsed time to extinction (t2) needs adding, i.e.  
 t3 = ((D50% –  IgTEx) x 2) + t2 
Table 4 shows the data as used to represent the average SCAM diagrams. 
 
CA Type PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat t0 t1 t2 t3 
All 11.1 3.3 6.8 5.7 0.0 0.4 1.1 1.3 
Cognitive 10.4 2.8 6.6 5.2 0.0 0.6 1.5 1.9 
Visual 14.4 5.0 8.6 7.5 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.2 
Motor 9.5 2.6 5.9 4.9 0.0 0.2 0.9 1.1 
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Table 4  Average data for the 8 SCAM parameters as used to draw the average SCAM diagrams 
in Figure 10. 
 
From Table 4 are derived the following four SCAM diagrams in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10 Average SCAM diagrams: (A) all; (B) cognitive; (C) visual; and (D) motor. 
 
For the task analysed, Figure 10A shows the shape of the general CA, but this may involve 
inappropriate averaging whereas the differences between the three classes of CAs (B, C, and 
D) is of interest because, at the very least, the results show that the analyst’s theoretical model 
has been successfully applied.  This is a post hoc result in that it was possible that after the 
analysis the SCAM diagrams would not be as anticipated; the results, however, are as expected. 
The number of neurons potentially in a CA (PotN) is highest for the visual CAs, and as can be 
seen in Table 5a, they are nearly 30% higher than the overall mean and nearly 40% higher than 
the cognitive CAs’ mean and 50% higher than the motor CAs’ mean.   
 /All /Cognitive /Motor 
Visual/ 29.7% 38.5% 51.6% 
Cognitive/ -6.4% - 9.5% 
Motor/ -14.4% - - 
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Table 5a  Difference in means for PotN. The backslash represents how parameters are 
divided, i.e. vertical parameter divided by horizontal one. 
The results in Table 5a reflects the theoretical assumptions that the visual cortex is large and 
visual processes complicated, so visual CAs will be concomitantly large, particularly when 
compared to those of the motor cortex and, although a great deal of the human cortex appears 
unspecialised, it has a great deal to do at any moment, i.e. there will be many cognitive CAs 
ignited in parallel and not just those identified in a specific analysis. 
The same pattern of results can be seen for differences in the means for both estimates of 
Threshold and IgMax, as can be seen in Tables 5b and 5c, respectively. 
 
 /All /Cognitive /Motor 
Visual/ 51.6% 78.6% 92.3% 
Cognitive/ -15.1% - 7.7% 
Motor/ -21.2% - - 
Table 5b Difference in means for Threshold. The backslash represents how parameters 
are divided, i.e. vertical parameter divided by horizontal one. 
 
 /All /Cognitive /Motor 
Visual/ 26.5% 30.3% 45.8% 
Cognitive/ -2.9% - 1.1% 
Motor/ -13.2% - - 
Table 5c Difference in means for IgMax. The backslash represents how parameters are 
divided, i.e. vertical parameter divided by horizontal one. 
Again, these results confirm that the theories have been successfully applied, in this case, that 
CAs, which may involve many neurons, i.e. a large PotN, will also tend to be large (IgMax) 
and with a relatively high Threshold to match. 
The raw data summarised in Tables 5a-c could be subjected to statistical analysis, but it is not 
done so in this paper because: (a) most differences would not be significant, given the sample 
sizes and even using non-parametric tests; (b) such analyses would be post hoc and therefore 
statistically weak; and (c) we would be guilty of data hunting and significance chasing.  On the 
other hand, clearly the potential is there for later, better planned research, to use decent 
analytical statistics. 
 
.4.2.1 Fatigue Results 
CAs are not simple negative feedback circuits in that the model of brain CA ignition is that 
they will fatigue, even with recruiting additional neurons from their potential pool (PotN), 
unless post ignition activity from other CAs adds to a CA’s activity.  N.B. the possibilities are 
for: (a) functionally just replacement neurons to maintain the current CA; or (b) similar, 
functionally related neurons, which might, for example, be involved in learning, even just up-
dating one of one’s Grandmother CAs when one visits her (see Introduction).  Otherwise, a CA 
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will fatigue and extinguish, “naturally”, i.e. they have a “life-expectancy”, without CA external 
neural support. 
Fatigue, in terms of the number of K neurons, is simply: IgMax – IgFat.  To compensate for 
different numbers of CAs in the three types analysed (N = All 48; Cognitive 18; Visual 16; 
Motor 14) Fatigue% is Fatigue divided by the size of the CA at ignition, i.e. ((IgMax – IgFat) 
/ IgMax) x 100.   
The fatigue data has been analysed in some detail.  The overall view is given in Table 6. 
 
 Fatigue IgMax Fatigue% 
All 1.1 6.8 16.2% 
Cognitive 1.4 6.6 21.2% 
Visual 1.1 8.6 12.8% 
Motor 1.0 5.9 17.0% 
Table 6  Fatigue and percentage Fatigue, i.e. the latter corrected for differing 
numbers of CA types. 
Stressing that there can be no hope of statistically significant results, it was hypothesised that 
the 8.4% difference in Fatigue% between cognitive and visual CAs could be interpreted as: (a) 
a difference between types of CA; or (b) due to time, that cognitive CAs last longer (Figure 
10).  Data for the duration of ignition (IgTEx – IgTIg) and Fatigue (IgMax – IgFat) were 
examined in detail but all attempts at even the most speculative hypothesis testing was thwarted 
by Fatigue’s range (0-3 K neurons for Cognitive and Motor CAs and 0-4 for Visual ones) and 
that the large majority of CAs had a Fatigue value of one. 
 
.4.2.2 Ignition Duration Results 
Following the above, failed, analysis, the CA ignition duration data (IgTEx – IgTIg) was 
examined further  The investigation was driven by a desire to understand the distribution of 
data that underlies, and thus causes, the arithmetical average values used in the SCAM 
diagrams (Figure 10).  The duration of a CA is one of its two primary features, and it can be 
argued its most important, not merely theoretically, but, critically, ignition duration is a 
measure in time (seconds), and time is linear.  The estimates of the size of CAs may be wildly 
incorrect (Introduction), but whatever the caveats about timing tasks expressed in section 4.1, 
one can have more confidence about sequence; the time estimates in the analysis can only be 
in error by a couple of tenths of a second, because the times must fit the sequence.  Furthermore, 
and consequentially, examination of the ignition duration data is less open to analyst bias, and 
thus of great potential value. 
Using bins of half a second, Figure 11 summarises the ignition duration of the types of CA. 
This figure represents the same data in two ways, as a histogram and a line graph. 
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Figure 11 Ignition durations of CA types presented as both line graphs and histograms. 
 
One would need a lot more data, but there is a hint that these CA ignition duration results are 
bi-modal, i.e. half the CAs last for less than half a second and most of the remainder last for 
over a second, with a few lasting over two seconds.  It would not be implausible that, in  the 
task, that there are two types of CA: short lasting ones and persisting ones. 
 
.4.2.3 Priming and Decay Results 
There is background activity in brains caused by neurons firing that appears random (section 
2.1).  The amount of such background activity may vary.  For example, in the visual system 
there is, overall, more activity in the optic nerve in darkness than under normal viewing 
conditions, because retinal processes use lateral inhibition, but this background lacks the highly 
organised transmission of spike trains down the optic nerve bundles that signal retinal receptive 
field stimulation of varying spatial frequencies, and their location.  What happens when 
disorganised activity reaches the visual cortex?  The various forms of pattern recognition CAs 
are not ignited, although people do report fleeting and vague visual experiences in darkness 
(phosphines).  We hypothesise that in such circumstances the overall background activity in 
the visual cortex may be quite high, but insufficient to ignite any of the vast number of potential 
visual CAs.   
Little is really known about the relationship between background neural activity and potential 
CA ignition and the same is so for both priming and decay: see the QPID model (Introduction).  
For example, with higher levels of background activity, would a CA need more, the same, or 
less priming to reach ignition?  Theoretically all are possible.  Similarly, are CA thresholds 
changed by an elevated background?   
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When a CA extinguishes, the evidence is that there is an initial rapid decay of member neurons, 
but what is less clear is whether the later stages of decay return to whatever is the background 
level, or remain above this level for an appreciable time, or suffer a refractory period where the 
CA is harder to re-ignite.  Furthermore, different CAs, and in different circumstances, may 
behave differently. 
Perhaps the most unsatisfactory aspect of the SCAM used concerns priming and decay.  Just 
looking at the SCAM diagrams (Figure 10), the priming and decay functions look exaggerated.  
This is undoubtedly caused by the single linear parameter used for each (P50% and D50%).  
Figure 12 shows a redrawn general SCAM diagram with more plausible priming and decay 
functions.  These issues are returned to in the Discussion (section 5.3.1). 
 
Figure12  Redrawn general SCAM diagram with original Figure 1 shown with dotted 
lines where these two figures differ. 
 
.4.3 CAAR Results 
In the SCAM, which does not model internal CA processes, for every output from a CA there 
is its equivalent input to another CA or to a motor output that goes outside the system studied.  
Therefore, one can either model CAAR inputs or outputs as the results of one simply mirroring 
the other.  The following analysis models outputs from CAs.  Due to lack of data, the following 
results are ignored: (a) the five non-visual perceptual CAs (touch and kinaesthetic); (b) the 
seven inhibitory relationships (all between cognitive and motor CAs); and (c) system external 
motor outputs. 
There were 89 relationships identified from the main analysis’ CAAR diagram (Figure 9) and 
their outputs, and to where these outputs go, is summarised in Table 7. 
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Table 7  Input-Output numbers between CAs of different types from the CAAR Diagram 
(Figure 9); horizontal output to vertical input. 
The same results can be represented graphically (Figure 13), where it is easier to see the 
cognitive architecture that was used during the main analysis (Appendix I). 
 
Figure 13  Graphical representation of Table 7’s Input-Output numbers between CAs 
of different types from the CAAR Diagram (Figure 9); main relationships in bold. 
 
Figure 13 confirms that in the vast majority of cases the Generic CAAR model (see section 2.3 
and its Figure 2) was adhered to successfully during analysis.  The centre portion of Figure 13 
represents the basic chain of cognitive CAs, although noting that while there were 18 cognitive 
CAs, there were 26 outputs from one cognitive CA to another because some cognitive CAs 
may output to more than one CA of this type, i.e. the “basic chain” does have some branches 
or overtakes. 
The intended, tight binding between cognitive CAs and visual ones (N=16) is well illustrated 
in Figure 13.  That the outputs between cognitive and visual CAs is not equal (20 versus 21 
relationships) is caused mostly by the occasional tight binding of motor and visual CAs.  For 
example, the ballistic movement of the right arm (CA 11 MRAB) directly primes the visual 
system to expect the appearance of the right hand (CA 12 VRH) without going through an 
intermediate cognitive CA.  Less than 5% (4/89) of the relationships analysed show such direct 
binding of motor and visual processes. 
 Visual → Cognitive → Motor → 
→ Visual 0 20 3 
→ Cognitive 21 26 1 
→ Motor 1 17 0 
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With one exception, inputs to the 14 motor CAs are from cognitive ones (N=17).  There are 
only four outputs from the motor CAs as most of their outputs will be to the mid or hind brain 
and body movement systems.  Many of these system external motor outputs will have inputs 
back into the system via sensory inputs.  For example, when a hand is under negative feedback 
control then there is a cycle of: motor CA output → motor behaviour → optical input → visual 
CAs → cognitive CAs → motor CAs → motor CA output … . 
 
.5 Discussion 
The authors consider the research reported to be fantastically successful, for a first 
demonstration!  This section therefore starts with the positives, first at the level of TA (5.1), 
and then at a more rarefied, philosophical level concerning the integration in a single model of 
both brain and mental function (5.2).  The final sub-section (5.3) suggests possible future 
developments of the work, including: development of a CA based TA technique; AI 
implementation of CAs; more general theoretical considerations; and some practical near term 
potential developments by the authors, and, they hope, others. 
 
.5.1 Task Analysis with a Cell Assembly Perspective 
That it is possible to carry out a TA using a CA perspective is itself a success.  The authors 
have worked for some years, together and independently, developing CA-based models and by 
exploiting TA’s applied psychological approach, it is perhaps not surprising that they could 
identify putative CAs to associate with the task analysed.  In terms of difficulty this is perhaps 
akin to attempting a tabula rasa GOMS analysis where every module decomposed must be 
invented from scratch, i.e. without reference to any previous GOMS analyses.   
A more impressive success is the development of the first TACAP technique.  The authors 
claim that their main analysis in Appendix I is their main result and the technique’s success 
can be judged by the difference between the first third of the analysis, when they were in an 
iterative development mode, and the latter two thirds, which went quite smoothly and, relative 
to other TA approaches, quite quickly.  While they are very cautious with the results (section 
4), these generally indicate that they applied the various theories about mind, brain and CAs in 
a consistent manner. 
In the end, the three representations developed, the SCAM diagrams, table and the CAAR 
diagram, were not only effective alone but were well integrated in that changes to one were 
usually relatively easy to propagate to the others, even though done manually (section 3.2).  
Naturally, we take Diaper’s (2001) point that complex method development, and particularly 
method specification, must be done with analysts’ software tool support.  This topic is 
continued in section 5.3.1. 
Acknowledging that the initial, main analysis covered but 9 seconds of elapsed task time, it is 
possible that any CA-based TA will always be at a low level of analysis and would therefore 
be unsuitable for analysing task of more than a few minutes.  On the other hand, even if this 
were so, there are many tasks or subtasks which are super safety critical, and therefore worthy 
of detailed, if expensive, analysis, e.g. the time between V0, when an aircraft is committed to 
take-off, and rotation, when the aircraft has sufficient airspeed and height above ground that it 
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can safely start to climb; or during an aircraft’s handover from one sector to another by air 
traffic controllers; and numerous similar situations.  Furthermore, first a CA-based technique 
might be used only on especially important subtasks and other TA methods used for the bigger 
task and, second, a library of CAs might allow overall task description at some meta-level that 
would then require only occasional descent to more detailed levels when appropriate. 
Beyond the scope of this paper, a meta-cognitive architecture at the CA level needs developing 
and specifying.  While such an architecture might include relatively distant brain areas, the 
expected focus would be within a localised brain area where, for example, two spatially 
adjacent, ignited CAs might already, or start, to share neurons and such sharing increases so as 
to create a super-CA; on subsequent ignitions, ignition of either will ignite the other.  Such a 
model hypothesises a tighter binding between CAs than that of two interacting with each other, 
but which don’t share any, or not very many, neurons.  It might be possible to distinguish super-
CAs from separate, interacting ones behaviourally in that ignition of one component CA 
(nearly) always causes ignition of the other(s) in the super-CA, whereas with separate CAs, 
then in some circumstances one CA igniting does not cause its sometimes related one(s) to 
ignite.  There aren’t great problems on the TA side about this since the levels concept is 
ubiquitous in TA, but a great deal remains to be done on CA meta-architectures, in the brain 
and in CA-based AIs.  Much of the cognitive psychology literature, e.g. on selected and divided 
attention, may also need some redrafting to fit better at a CA level of analysis.  
 
.5.2 Psychology, Neuroscience and Artificial Intelligence 
The relationship between brain and mind remains one of the great scientific puzzles.  
Neuroscience involves describing the physiology and biochemistry of the brain whereas 
scientific cognitive psychology describes the mind as an information processing device (see 
Introduction).  At best for such models of brain and mind, they represent two different 
descriptions of the same thing, a physical one and a functional one, respectively.  Such different 
descriptions of a thing are often conflated, for example, describing the heart as a “muscular 
fluid pump” combines its physical physiology with its function as a pump; for further 
discussion see Scott- Phillips et al. (2011) in the context of their distinction between proximate 
and ultimate explanations: the former correspond to physical, brain, descriptions and the later 
to mental, functional ones. 
There are a number of problems with careless conflation of different descriptions.  An obvious 
one concerns establishing functionality.  For example, one might describe an electric hand drill 
as a device for making holes, but if it is considered as a spike rotator, then its functionality can 
be extended to sanding and polishing and, using a crank, such a drill can perform tasks 
involving linear reciprocating motion, e.g. sawing.  Furthermore, multiple functionality is 
common in biology, e.g. that bones provide structural support and the production of red blood 
cells.  The brain is particularly complicated because a great deal of the cortex is unspecialised, 
as far as currently known, and can be involved in many and apparently very different tasks.  
Such a property is central to the SCAM and its PotN conception. 
There are areas of the cortex that do have a specialised functionality, but just what this might 
be is difficult to establish with complete certainty.  Whatever physiological methods are used, 
the basic problem is the range of tasks tested.  As a hypothetical illustration, one might find a 
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brain area that is always active during language tasks, and careful experimentation might show 
this area is only active during parsing, but whether it is a specialised language parser, or part 
of one, would remain moot.  Apart from the problems of specifying functionality, it is always 
possible that the same area may be active in tasks that are untested, say when riding a bicycle 
or listening to music, and the range of untested tasks is effectively infinite. 
The logical problems remain at whatever physiological level of detailed studied, from single 
cell recording to what are quite large brain areas, i.e. relative to the size and number of neurons 
involved, and this is also the case with CA-based models.  Indeed, it might seem that the 
problems are hardest at the CA level, but they do have a subtle advantage in that ignited CAs 
exist only temporarily and so searching for fixed brain neuron or area functionality will often 
be bootless.  A further, more important advantage to using CAs to model both brain and mind 
is that there is a tight binding between the two such that the physical properties of a CA closely 
match their functional, information processing ones.  No such tight binding exists for the 
physiology of larger brain units and traditional cognitive psychology, and while there is a 
similar tight binding at the level of single cells, we hypothesised in the Introduction that a 
Grandmother neuron might be better understood as being a frequent member of a Grandmother 
CA, which also solves the problem of what happens if such a cell dies. 
CA-based ANNs also suffer the same logical problems in that once they have been running, 
and learning, for some time, then the function of a particular CA is difficult to infer, even 
though the state of the whole system is open to inspection.  In contrast, with symbolic AIs such 
as ACT-R, the function of each of its software modules is well understood as these are 
programmed using traditional software methods, i.e. the functionality is as well understood as 
for that of any piece of correctly running software code.  Although the authors are confident 
they could do so, with sufficient resources, they have not attempted to implement anything 
from their first TACAP analysis as a CA-based ANN.  Their plans on this are discussed further 
in section 5.3.4. 
The authors’ view is that a major benefit of this first TACAP analysis is that of a precursor to 
a General Theory of both brain and mind.  This is discussed further in section 5.3.3.  TACAP 
is intended to encourage cognitive scientists of all sorts to consider both the neural and 
cognitive at the CA level and, by exploiting the applied cognitive approach of TA, facilitate 
creative, sensible proposals about CAs and their architecture.  When TA is done well, then it 
places quite severe constraints on what is “sensible” and, as illustrated throughout Appendix I, 
a considerable amount of psychology is involved; and with TACAP, some neuroscience as 
well. 
 
.5.3 Future Developments  
This TACAP paper is the start of a story.  While research on both TA and CAs has been going 
on for decades, it is their combination that makes TACAP unique.  The following subsections 
outline work that needs doing to further develop TACAP (sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2), how it 
might have substantial theoretical consequences (5.3.3), and the authors’ near term plans for 
TACAP development (5.3.4). 
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.5.3.1 Method and Software 
Continuing from section 5.1 and the essential requirement to develop analyst support tools, 
Figure 14 shows one high level, user perspective of the suite of tools that need developing for 
this paper’s TACAP technique.   
 
Figure 14  Software tools suite required to automate the TACAP technique. 
 
It is assumed that existing or new tools would support analysts working with various types of 
task performance data and that AL lines would be imported into the Main Analysis tools.  It is 
envisaged that the latter is the analyst user’s main interface that, apart from free text entries, 
would automate the decisions made and, of course, test and flag inconsistencies, a.k.a. current 
errors, in an ongoing analysis.  From the early stages of a TACAP analysis, as CAs are 
identified they would create SCAM Table entries and, as the parameters are filled in, then there 
may be feedback to the Main Analysis tools.  Once each CA’s SCAM table’s row of data are 
all filled in, then a SCAM diagram is created for that CA and made available in the Main 
Analysis tools.  The SCAM Table tools also seed the CAAR Analysis tools with both identified 
CAs and their location on the task timeline.  The analyst user must still specify relationships 
between CAs, but producing the CAAR diagram should be at least semi-automated.  
Furthermore, much more sophisticated relationships between CAs could be relatively easy to 
specify than was realistic with the first, manual analysis, e.g. cycles of feedback between CAs 
could be indicated, say by multiple arrow heads, and types of input/output could also be coded 
beyond the simple excitatory or inhibitory relationships used in this first analysis. 
Noting the priming and decay parts of the SCAM, P50% and D50%, were clumsy for producing 
the SCAM diagrams manually (section 4.2.3 and Figure 12), a simple power function would 
could easily be applied in a SCAM diagram production tool. 
Similarly, the sub-optimal entries to the SCAM table with respect to generating SCAM 
diagrams in a manual analysis (section 4.2, Tables 3 and 4 and Figure 10) involve trivial 
software calculation, allowing future tools to optimise the user analyst’s ease of input as the 
simple backend software would take care of the rest.  These are examples that emphasise the 
importance of software tools to support the development and specification of complex methods. 
While a design feature of the first TACAP analysis was to include various capabilities to cross-
check within and across the main representations, the suspicion is that the analysis is not 
entirely error free, notwithstanding many hours of testing.  As an example, only after the first 
draft of this paper was completed was it discovered that CA VHWA (Visual Hot water Area) 
was correctly present in the CAAR diagram but entirely absent from the SCAM table and 
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Appendix I; most of the testing had been done between the latter two.  The belief is that a 
reasonable analysts software suite would not only make analyses better, and nigh error free, 
but would reduce analysis time to a third or a quarter of what it might take to do manually.   
Experience with developing such tools, e.g. Diaper’s (e.g. 2001) LUTAKD toolkit, suggests 
that in addition to being essential for method specification, such tools are also likely to change 
the method itself, not least because what was implausible effort in a manual analysis becomes 
easy with appropriate software.  Nigh impossible to predict in advance, as an example, one 
candidate would be the animation of the CAAR diagram.   For the initial TACAP analysis, the 
CAAR diagram was done in PowerPoint (section 3.2) and for the expert user it is relatively 
easy to animate the timeline and the CA boxes and the arrows.  Like envisaging the SCAM 
diagrams without drawing most of them (section 3.2), the CAAR diagram was only animated 
in the analyst’s mind during analysis.  The animation (Appendix III) was only done after the 
main analyses were completed.  On the other hand, for less visually adept analysts, they might 
well find an automatically animated CAAR diagram of considerable help.  It should certainly 
help when presenting such work to conference or seminar audiences. 
 
.5.3.2 Artificial Intelligence 
The evidence is that CAs do exist in the brain (Harris, 2005; Huyck and Passmore, 2013; and 
Introduction), although a great deal of our understanding of CAs has arisen from AI work with 
ANNs.  No doubt there are interesting scientific research opportunities involving the mimicry 
of brains and minds (section 5.3.3), but future, practical applications of CA-based AIs depends 
on identifying roles and functions. One CABot, for example (Huyck et al., 2011), was 
implemented as a robot in a virtual, simple games-like environment with a general role of 
operating as a user’s assistant.  TA is rarely done frivolously because it is expensive in time, 
money, and human resources, of expert analysts and task performers.  Monitoring and assisting 
users in complex, safety critical tasks, particularly when tasks and their environments are 
variable and require rapid decision making, for example in aviation as mentioned in section 
5.1, would seem to provide appropriate and useful application areas for development of 
versions of the TACAP approach and their useful implementation as CA-based AI assistants. 
Building the CABot systems provides confidence that such CA-based AIs, with only minimal 
initial programming, are able to learn to carry out tasks.  They will develop their own CAs by 
unsupervised learning, by trial and error.  As discussed in section 5.2, it is difficult to infer such 
CAs’ functionality even though there is the potential to inspect every state in every program 
cycle.  Unless particular CAs are forced on a system, then it is unlikely that AI CAs  will 
coincide with brain and mind CAs, i.e. both AIs and people can learn to perform the notional 
“same” task but the fine details at the CA-level will differ.  The same is true between any two 
people and, anyway, even frequently repeated tasks by the same person will not use quite the 
same CAs each time.  We cope with these within and between differences in people and it will 
be necessary to extend the same coping strategies to genuinely intelligent, flexible, self-
learning AIs. 
We believe that CA based AIs will become increasingly popular. They are capable of learning 
new domains and while all AI systems are currently domain specific, CA-based systems will 
be more flexible than Expert/Knowledge Based Systems or symbolic ones.  A virtual agent 
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with a simulated neural brain will function in an environment, and learn significant aspects of 
that environment.  Upfront programming effort required in symbolic AI development, and 
maintenance, will be replaced by the self-programming capabilities of CA-based systems, 
although there may be a cost if it is necessary to provide learning nurseries for new CA-based 
AIs.  Perhaps within only a few decades, but after the emancipation of the early CA-based AIs, 
people will have another highly intelligent species with which to share planet Earth; and one 
that can talk to us in our own languages. 
 
.5.3.3 General Theories of Psychology and Neuroscience 
A General Theory is, within its scope, a theory of everything.  General Theories are quite 
common in psychology, even if below cognitive psychology’s axiom concerning the mind as 
an information device, and they are often quite simple.  What makes a CA-based General 
Theory attractive is the “tight binding” (section 5.2) between psychology and physiology.  A 
possible future development might be the deliberate conflation of description of brain and 
mind, producing descriptions where a CA has physical properties, presumably an improvement 
of the SCAM table, and functional ones, what the CA does and its relationships to other CAs. 
Traditionally, psychology has borrowed from other technologies, from Victorian hydraulics, 
e.g. people feel pressure, to computing, and even changing psychological models as 
technologies improve, e.g. Diaper’s (1989b) PDP8 versus PDP11 models of cognition (the 
PDP8 models do operations in registers whereas the PDP11 ones dispense with registers 
altogether).  With CAs, for once the direction might be opposite, in that there is a chance for 
such a psychology to focus physiological studies, i.e. having posited the existence of one or 
more CAs, then the physiologists might try and find them. 
Such possibilities may be some considerable time away as at the moment too little is known 
about CAs, in brains, minds and in AIs.  Indeed, the TACAP development was explicitly 
intended to encourage cognitive scientists to think and work at the CA-level and, over time, 
thus might an international community become established. 
 
.5.3.4 Practical Near Term Developments  
While the authors wish to enthuse others with a practical approach to CA-orientated thinking, 
they have some near term plans following this paper’s publication.  They will offer seminars 
and conference presentations focusing on special aspects of the TACAP research suitable for 
different audiences.  The full animation of the CAAR diagram (Appendix III) might be 
particularly useful for these (section 5.2).  At least one on-line presentation will also be 
developed. 
We are also in the process of developing a proto-neural cognitive architecture.  We can 
currently implement simple associative memories, and generic rule based systems in simulated 
spiking neurons.  Combining these will make a proto-neural cognitive architecture, which 
could be used for executing tasks to simulate, at a neural level, task execution.  An obvious 
extension would be to extend our existing binary CAs to more complex ones that behaved as 
those described in the analysis (Appendix I).  This would enable us to develop the TA 
mechanism in step with a neural cognitive architecture. 
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.6 Conclusions 
The authors believe that this is a ‘John the Baptist’ paper that starts a new chapter in the 
combination of psychology, neuroscience and AI.  In the end, it is probably not what they have 
done that is important, but how they did it.  The TACAP provides an easy entrance for others 
to learn to think at the CA level.  Appendix I, the main analysis, is crucial for such a purpose 
as it contains 65 examples of CAs which others can study and use as a basis for identifying 
CAs in more appropriate tasks. 
Although the trend in ergonomics is to study general systems above the level of tasks, as 
Sociotechnical Systems (e.g. Stanton and Harvey, 2017), and sometimes called Systems-of-
Systems (Harvey and Stanton, 2014), the essential need for the detailed study of some tasks 
will remain.  Recently the terms “Artificial Intelligence” and “AI” have entered popular 
awareness, although, like “psychology” for much longer, the general public may know little 
beyond the terms themselves.  Just how intelligent, if at all, some of the systems that these days 
claim to be AI is open to question, but the AI cat is now out of the bag and genuinely intelligent 
systems may result from AI’s commercialisation. 
TACAP is at least paddling hard to catch the crest of the coming AI wave.  As a new approach 
it lacks much of the baggage of older TA approaches, which might further commend it for 
development. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
The ‘First Steps to Making Coffee’ TACAP Main Analysis Descriptions. 
 
At the kitchen entrance … 
01 CA: COGNITIVE – Kitchen Entrance Check (CKEC) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
CKEC 10 2 7 6 -1.0 0.0 0.4 0.5 
 
INPUTS: “… at kitchen entrance”. 
   CA: VISUAL – Kitchen Entrance General (VKEG). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: VISUAL – Kitchen Entrance General (VKEG), 
CA: COGNITIVE – Make Coffee (CMC), 
CA: COGNITIVE – Approach Hot Water Area (CAHWA). 
Primed by the various CAs that have bought the subject to the kitchen entrance, the CA is 
ignited at T0, or just before, and represents the expectation of what, in general, the kitchen 
should look like.  It checks for major disasters: fire, smoke, steam, flooding, major damage to 
cabinets and window, but not details such as whether the cooker is on.  It also checks that there 
is no one else in the kitchen and that the floor is clear of obstructions, e.g. shopping not yet 
unpacked. 
This CA, or something similar, must rationally exist because if there is a major problem with 
the kitchen then it will be immediately detected at the entrance.  For a cognitive CA this one is 
modelled as being fairly large (PotN 10K) because a general view of the kitchen is a 
complicated one, so its expectation CA must also be fairly large.  Its threshold (2K) is fairly 
low and most (IgMax 7K) of its potential neuron membership are modelled as firing after 
ignition as the CA will nearly always last only very briefly, whether the kitchen is judged 
satisfactory or not. 
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Post ignition it then takes input from ‘CA: VISUAL – Kitchen Entrance General’ (VKEG) and 
makes a match comparison of expectation to visual input. Note, the comparison process is here 
modelled as part of CKEC but an alternative would be to have a CA that took inputs from both 
cognitive and visual CAs and it then makes the comparison. This sort of general comparison 
of expectations to visual input must be a fairly common type of operation.  Whatever CA 
Architecture (CAA) chosen, however, the effect of the visual input is basically inhibitory, the 
cognitive CA is turned off either because the kitchen is judged as satisfactory or other 
emergency dealing CAs are ignited.  If satisfactory, the cognitive CA to Make Coffee (CMC) 
is reignited.  This must precede the striding into the kitchen as alternatives at this point involve 
going to other kitchen locations, and such movements are all highly practiced and would have 
similar CAs to the making coffee one.   
There is a CAA issue concerning how tasks might share common CAs, for example, the early 
stages of making either coffee or tea are behaviourally identical, but still might use different 
CAs, or, perhaps more likely, neuron membership may overlap between coffee and tea making 
CAs, if exactly the same CAs are not used, which may be simplest option for analysis purposes. 
 
02 CA: VISUAL – Kitchen Entrance General (VKEG) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
VKEG 20 10 15 14 -0.8 0.1 0.3 0.4 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNTIVE – Kitchen Entrance Check (CKEC). 
OUTPUTS: CA: COGNTIVE – Kitchen Entrance Check (CKEC). 
Typically visual CAs are large (PotN 20K for VKEG) because the visual cortex is large and 
with complex scenes then thresholds need to be relatively high, but if CAs are to persist then 
there must also be a sufficiency of neurons that can fire as some fatigue and so CA ignition can 
be maintained. 
A saccade takes about a quarter of a second and during such eye movements retinal output to 
the optic nerve is suppressed.  Thus this CA cannot ignite until after the kitchen entrance is 
reached (T0), and the prior visual CAs are suppressed. Its function is primarily as the data 
provider for CKEC.  
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The CA will be suppressed (overwritten) by following visual input, although if the cognitive 
check fails then it may persists for several saccades as the problem is generally inspected. 
 
03 CA: COGNITIVE – Make Coffee (CMC) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
CMC 5 1 2 1.5 -1.0 0.4 2.5 4.0 
 
 INPUTS: “… at kitchen entrance”. 
CA: COGNITIVE – Kitchen Entrance Check (CKEC). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Approach Hot Water Area (CAHWA). 
Discussed in general (Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2), the Make Coffee CA is already primed, and 
probably more so at the kitchen entrance, and must ignite when the general kitchen checking 
CA (CKEC) extinguishes as there are several possible destinations within the kitchen, 
including, for example, curvetting through 130 degrees to go to the fridge (section 3.3.2).  
In its minimal decision making form where the CA does not contain a plan for making coffee, 
the CA is quite small (PotN 5K) and post-ignition, after directing the subject to the hot water 
making area it decays until it is below threshold.  It remains primed, however, as it needs to be 
re-ignited when water is added to the empty kettle as the amount added depends on what hot 
beverage, in what sized mug or cup, is being prepared, e.g. a count of 15 (seconds) for a small 
mug of coffee versus 20 for a large mug (N.B. The kettle has no external indicator of how much 
water is in it). 
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04 CA: COGNITIVE – Approach Hot Water Area (CAHWA) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
CAHWA 10 2 5 3 0.5 0.6 3.1 3.2 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Kitchen Entrance Check (CKEC), 
   CA: COGNITIVE – Make Coffee (CMC). 
CA: VISUAL – Approach Hot Water Area (VAHWA). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: VISUAL – Approach Hot Water Area (VAHWA). 
   CA: COGNITIVE – Kettle in Hot Water Area (CKHWA); 
CA: MOTOR – Stride to Hot Water Area (MSHWA). 
Apart from flow-field related visual inputs, the CA operates, like the kitchen entrance check 
(CKEC), as an expectation, checking the foveal input against what should be in the hot water 
area, how it is organised (the strong expectation is “neatly”); if the kettle were missing then 
this would certainly cause a “pause & consider” CA; output from the CA causes ignition of the 
kettle search and identify CA (CKHWA) 
This CAHWA CA will persist the longest of the three related approach CAs (motor, visual and 
cognitive), i.e. until after movement to the hot water area has stopped (MSHWA); the visual 
(VAHWA) CA extinguishes even earlier as the flow fields become increasingly peripheral 
close to the hot water area.  
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05 CA: VISUAL – Approach Hot Water Area (VAHWA) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
VAHWA 20 2 10 6 0.6 0.7 2.5 2.6 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Approach Hot water Area (CAHWA). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Approach Hot Water Area (CAHWA). 
The CA is part of the specialised visual processing involved with moving through an 
environment.  Interest in visual flow fields (Gibson, 1950) was rekindled with Marr’s (1982) 
computational approach to vision; the theory remains that flow fields are handled separately 
from other, more integrated, visual processes.   
A lot of neurons (PotN 20K) are potentially involved and a low threshold of 2K is set since this 
sort of processing is used constantly and can be for many hours (e.g. car driving.  N.B. different 
CAs are ignited as visually the road ahead (and behind one hopes for safety reasons) changes). 
On the other hand, in this highly practiced task of about 3 seconds the proposed CAA is that 
VAHWA is a self-terminating CA and that the neurons at ignition are not much replaced, hence 
fatigue is relatively high (IgMax – IgFat = 10K – 6K = 4K), i.e. 40% of the neurons have 
fatigued but sufficient survive to maintain ignition above threshold (2K). P50% & D50% are 
very fast as part of this type of visual processing: an on-demand, switch on-off facility. 
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06 CA: MOTOR – Stride To Hot Water Area (MSHWA) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
MSHWA 10 2 7 6 0.6 0.7 3.0 3.1 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Approaching Hot Water Area (CAHWA). 
 OUTPUTS: motor behaviours … 
From the shuffle zone outside the kitchen entrance, the right foot is planted in the centre of the 
entrance as described above (section 3.3.2).  The CA is ignited by CAHWA once the general 
kitchen check CA confirms the kitchen is in a suitable state.  There is no observable behavioural 
pause at the entrance and from detailed analysis the main subject always approaches the hot 
water preparation area with three strides (left, right, left) and then a right footed half stride that 
curves the right foot so it ends up next to the left (Figure 3).  The strides are longer than a usual 
walking step around the house and the whole behaviour is very precise in that it ends with the 
body close, but not touching, the hot water preparation area; toes are never stubbed or the knees 
hit the cabinet beneath the work surface, although the knees come within a few centimetres of 
this vertical surface. 
The other three resident adults have also been observed approaching the hot water area. The 
subject’s daughter, in her early 30s and nearly as tall as her father, takes the same three strides 
and the final right foot movement in a manner indistinguishable from those described above.  
In contrast, the wife, in her early 70s, takes five steps, not strides, as she is considerably shorter, 
but repeated observation suggests that a similar behavioural invariance is present.  The fourth 
resident, in his early 30s, had only lived in the house for about 6 months and doesn’t use the 
kitchen that much. Observed from his approach to the kitchen down the corridor, his behaviour 
was inconsistent, e.g. either foot could be the launch one, and, indeed, he was much less 
accurate at reaching the hot water area, a final shuffle being required.  The obvious conclusion 
is that the family who have all lived in the house for over twenty years have a CA for approach 
that the new lodger does not. 
As a learned and highly practiced behaviour, the MSHWA one need be of only modest size 
(PotN 10K), with a low threshold (2K) and most of its neurons firing on ignition since it cannot 
persist meaningfully beyond the completion of the behaviour.  The CA does, however, have to 
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be of sufficient size to take cognitive approach inputs from CAHWA based on that CA’s visual 
inputs from VAHWA as the three strides need to compensate for the location of the launching 
right foot, which may vary up to 30cm in front of or behind the bar on the floor of the kitchen 
entrance. 
 
It is likely that the basic SCAM diagram is not an adequate representation of this CA, which, 
for example, might have internal processes representing the strides and terminal shuffle as 
shown above. 
A number of alternative CA Architectures (CAAs) were considered for MSHWA, notably a 
CAA where this motor CA might ignite its associated visual CA (VAHWA) and receive 
feedback from this, rather than being mediated by the cognitive CA (CAHWA).   
As a codicil to the above concerning the invariant striding behaviour, this occurs when the 
subject is not carrying something into the kitchen, most probably an empty coffee mug.  In a 
more complete analysis an alternative CA involving striding to the sink to deposit an empty 
mug to the right of the sink in preparation for washing needs specifying, although the CAs 
involved are similar to the ones described above; there is a sidestep from sink to hot water area 
after mug deposition. 
A further CAA issue concerns the extent that CAs are common in different tasks. Behaviourally 
there is no difference between making tea rather than coffee when going to the hot water area 
and filling the kettle.  There is a difference as to how much water is put in the kettle (25% less 
for a small mug). 
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07 CA: COGNITIVE – Kettle in Hot Water Area (CKHWA)  
 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
CKHWA 10 3 7 6 0.8 1.0 2.1 2.2 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Approach Hot Water Area (CAHWA), 
   CA: VISUAL – Kettle in Hot Water Area (VKHWA). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: VISUAL – Kettle in Hot Water Area (VKHWA). 
   CA: COGNITIVE – Kettle Handle (CKH). 
The kitchen’s hot water area is a complex of small and medium sized objects which are nearly 
all in standard locations, although the kettle and circular tray may lay within an area of about 
5cm radius beyond their footprints. The CA therefore needs to be reasonably sized (PotN 10K), 
although the threshold is low (3K).  Ignition lasts about a second before being replaced by the 
more detailed target, the kettle handle (CKH). 
 
08 CA: VISUAL – Kettle In Hot Water Area (VKHWA) 
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ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
VKHWA 20 5 10 9 1.2 1.3 2.0 2.1 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Kettle In Hot Water Area (CKHWA), 
 OUTPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Kettle In Hot Water Area (CKHWA. 
Primed and ignited from inputs from CKHWA, feedback between the two CAs directs and 
identifies the kettle’s location within the cluttered hot water area. The CA gradually decays 
post-ignition as the more specific kettle handle target is acquired in the next two CAs (CKH 
and VKH). 
 
09 CA: COGNITIVE – Kettle Handle (CKH) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
CKH 5 1 3 2 1.5 1.6 3.5 3.6 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Kettle In Hot Water Area (CKHWA). 
   CA: VISUAL – Kettle Handle (VKH). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: VISUAL – Kettle Handle (VKH). 
   CA: MOTOR – Right Arm Ballistic (MRAB). 
   CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Approach (CRHA). 
As an object the kettle’s handle is very simple, being a uniform, matt dark grey/black and 
smoothly shaped.  Thus it does not need a large CA (PotN 5K) to be identified as the critical 
task target for control of the right hand approach to the handle. The CA does have to represent 
the current orientation of the handle, but the corner location of the hot water area means that 
the handle will virtually always be to the right within an arc of less than 90 degrees.  
The CA persists for about two seconds and then decays quickly and before the right hand 
actually grips the handle because the hand obscures its target in the final approach stage.  N.B. 
general introspective experience suggests that once part of an object is gripped so as to transport 
the object, the gripped part of the object itself is ignored, whether it be a kettle handle, a book, 
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a bag or whatever; a CA for the object itself must still be ignited as different objects are treated 
differently while being transported, e.g. I wouldn’t try and empty a book over the kitchen sink 
(below this is the CA ‘Lift Kettle’ (CLK) to indicate its difference from when the kettle is, for 
example, located on its base unit). 
 
10 CA: VISUAL – Kettle Handle (VKH) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
VKH 10 3 7 6 1.6 1.8 3.3 3.4 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Kettle Handle (CKH). 
OUTPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Kettle Handle (CKH). 
Like CKH, which primes and ignites this CA (Threshold 3K), VKH is smaller than many other 
visual CAs (PotN 10K). It provides feedback to CKH which it pre-extinguishes. 
 
11 CA: MOTOR – Right Arm Ballistic (MRAB) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
MRAB 5 1 2 2 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 
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INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Kettle Handle (CKH) 
OUTPUTS:  CA: VISUAL – Right Hand (VRH) 
This is the first of the two parts of normal human reaching behaviour. Visually it is open-loop 
control, i.e. without feedback, although there must be some kinaesthetic feedback, not least the 
position of the arm when the hand is launched towards its target.  It is ignited by CKH when 
feedback from VKH to CKH establishes that the target kettle handle has entered reach. 
It’s assumed in the model to be a small CA (PotN 5K) that exists for between, say, 50 and 
150ms. 
In the CAA described here it is assumed that this CA primes and ignites a visual CA (VRH), 
rather than a cognitive one, as the right hand, as expected, enters view.  
 
12 CA: VISUAL – Right hand (VRH) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
VRH 15 2 5 4 2.0 2.1 3.2 3.3 
 
 INPUTS: CA: MOTOR – Right Arm Ballistic (MRAB). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand (CRH). 
Ignited by MRAB, the CA predicts where the right hand will appear and then identifies its 
position and general configuration.  
Note, human babies acquire visual tracking & the concept of object permanence fairly early in 
development. Also, we do often look at our hands, probably because kinaesthetic feedback is 
less precise than vision, and touch. 
It’s relatively small for a visual CA (PotN 15K) and has a low threshold (2K), strong ignition 
(IgMax 5K) and relatively little fatigue (IgFat 4K) because although ignition is only about a 
second here, it may have to persist for much long periods of time so must have a structure that 
facilitates neuron rotation to counter fatigue.   
The CA is different from those used in manipulative tasks, but often precedes and initiates such 
tasks and subtasks.  
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13 CA: COGNITIVE – Right hand (CRH) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
CRH 12 3 7 6 2.1 2.2 3.4 3.5 
 
 INPUTS: CA: VISUAL – Right Hand (VRH) 
 OUTPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Hot water Area (CHWA) 
   CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Approach (CRHA) 
Representing a general model of the hand, the CA, like VRH, needs to be of sufficient size 
(PotN 12K) to counter fatigue (IgFat 6K), and ditto w.r.t to threshold (3K) and IgMax (7K). 
It causes CHWA to ignite so that the hand can be placed in its context relative to itself and its 
target, the kettle handle (CKH); these three CAs will be used as inputs by CRHA to control the 
right hand’s final approach to the kettle handle. 
 
14 CA: COGNITIVE – Hot water Area (CHWA) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
CHWA 15 5 10 8 2.2 2.4 3.5 3.7 
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 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand (CRH), 
   CA: VISUAL – Hot Water Area (VHWA). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: VISUAL – Hot Water Area (VHWA), 
CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Approach (CRHA). 
This CA supplies a specialised representation of the hot water area, basically ignoring expected, 
static objects except for those that might interfere with the right hand’s approach to the kettle 
handle.  It provides the context for the hand’s “flight path”, in effect the tunnel of clear, relevant 
space between the tray holding the coffee cone (which is a potential flight hazard on the left) 
and the left side of the drainer, which could mean a wall on the right of over 20cm if large pots 
and their lids are draining, and which considerably narrows the hand’s possible path to the 
kettle handle. 
It is big for a cognitive CA (PotN 15K) because it not only deals with a complex visual input, 
but a specialised one that provides the critical input for CRHA to plan the hand-to-kettle flight 
path which CRHA then controls. In CAA terms it is here modelled as one of number of hot 
water area CAs.  An alternative CAA would be to have a sufficiently general hot water area 
visual CA that it could be directed to different aspects of its input (visual attention).  The 
preference here is due to it being a highly practice task so CAs will be relatively specialised, 
which is not to say that neurons in the CHWA at one time could not be part of other hot water 
related CAs at other times. 
 
15 CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Approach (CRHA) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
CRHA 25 5 15 12 2.3 2.5 3.6 3.7 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Kettle Handle (CKH) 
   CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand (CRH) 
   CA: COGNITIVE – Hot water Area (CHWA), 
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   CA: VISUAL – Right Hand Approach (VRHA), 
   CA: TOUCH – Right Hand on Kettle Handle (TRHKH). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: VISUAL – Right Hand Approach (VRHA) 
   CA MOTOR – Right Hand Approach (MRHA), 
   CA: TOUCH – Right Hand on Kettle Handle (TRHKH), 
   CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Grip (CRHG) 
This is big for a, still task specialised, cognitive CA (PotN 25K) and it undoubtedly is composed 
of a number of CAs below the level of this analysis.  It’s main functions are to: (i) integrate 
inputs from cognitive CAs concerning the kettle handle, right hand and the hot water area; (ii) 
compute the right hand’s path to the kettle handle, avoiding obstructions, and (iii) control that 
path under visual negative feedback control, including (iv) adjustments to the hand and wrist 
in preparation to gripping the kettle handle at the trajectory’s termination; and (v) it’s final 
function before self-extinction is to supress MRHA and so halt the reaching behaviour once 
the handle is touched (TRHKH) and ignite the cognitive CA for gripping the kettle handle 
(CRHG). 
It is well primed by its cognitive inputs and has a low threshold (5K) and a high IgMax (15K) 
while still having sufficient potential neurons to cope with both fatigue and the internal 
inhibition of some of its own neurons during processing (IgFat 12K).  It may only last a second 
or so, but it is a cognitively complex, active second. 
 
16 CA: VISUAL – Right Hand Approach (VRHA) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
VRHA 25 10 15 14 2.3 2.6 3.3 3.4 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Approach (CRHA). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Approach (CRHA). 
This CA provides the visual input to CRHA that allows visual negative feedback control of the 
right hand approaching the kettle handle.  It is fairly large, even for a visual CA (PotN 25K) 
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and is well primed and finally ignited by CRHA.  Although here lasting less than a second, it 
must have fatigue resisting capabilities by neuron rotation as in other tasks it may have to 
remain ignited for much longer.  It extinguishes before CRHA when the hand obscures the 
target kettle handle in the final approach stage. 
 
17 CA: MOTOR – Right Hand Approach (MRHA) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
MRHA 10 2 7 6 2.4 2.7 3.7 3.8 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Approach (CRHA). 
 OUTPUTS: motor behaviour … 
The CA provides the motor component to CRHA’s control of the hand approaching the kettle 
handle and also for configuring the hand so as to be ready to grasp the kettle handle. N.B. In 
the CAA used in the analysis, here there is no direct I/O between the visual and motor systems 
except via the cognitive one (CRHA); an alternative would be I/O between VRHA and MRHA, 
which may be plausible for fine control; similarly when the kettle handle is touched and 
TRHKH is ignited, it could be used to extinguish MRHA rather than, as modelled, extinction 
is via CHRA suppressing it. 
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18 CA: TOUCH – Right Hand to Kettle Handle (TRHKH) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
TRHKH 5 2 3 2 3.0 3.5 3.8 3.9 
 
INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Approach (CRHA) 
 OUTPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Approach (CRHA) 
This CA signals the end of the right hand’s kettle approaching behaviour.  Although a small 
CA (PotN 5K), it has a low threshold (2K) and will have been extensively primed by CRHA 
(IgTIg – P50% = 0.5 seconds) because it is so critical that the reaching behaviour is neatly 
halted, even if CRHA slows the approach in the final fractions of a second. 
 
19 CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Grip (CRHG) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
CRHG 5 2 3 2 3.2 3.7 3.8 4.2 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Approach (CRHA). 
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   CA: TOUCH – Right Hand Grip (TRHG). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: TOUCH – Right Hand Grip (TRHG). 
CA: MOTOR – Right Hand Grip (MRHG). 
CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Hold (CRHH). 
Like TRHKH this CA is well primed (IgTIg – P50% = 0.5 seconds) and then ignited as CRHA’s 
final function. It needs only to be a small CA (PotN 5K) since its only concern is the actual 
closing of the right hand on the kettle handle.  It doesn’t last long, just sufficient to ignite its 
motor CA (MRHG). There is also negative feedback from TRHG relating to the force of the 
gripping behaviour. 
Before extinction CRHG ignites the right hand holding of the kettle (CRHH).  It is modelled 
as decaying quite slowly (IgTEx – D50% = 0.4 seconds) so as to allow re-ignition if there is a 
problem with holding the kettle, howsoever rare. 
In a very early SCAM analysis the difference between gripping the kettle handle and then 
holding it were not differentiated.  Subsequently it became clear that this resulted in a SCAM 
diagram that could not be described using the SCAM parameters because what was needed was 
an initial ignition to represent the grasp and then a steady holding-the-kettle-handle state.  Just 
as there are two answers to Popper’s Black Swan problem (either the theory’s wrong or, by 
definition, it is not a swan), so we have preferred the latter option, i.e. to separate the initial 
grip from the subsequent, long term holding of the kettle handle.  Some psychological 
justification for this is offered below concerning CRHH. 
 
20 CA: MOTOR – Right Hand Grip (MRHG) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
MRHG 5 1 3 2 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.0 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Grip (CRHG). 
 OUTPUTS: motor behaviour … 
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This is a fairly standard small motor CA (PotN 5K), specialised for the task but one of (tens 
of?) thousands of other similarly specialised ones (e.g. gripping one’s coffee cup before 
drinking from it and, indeed, picking up any “well known” object). It is ignited by CRHG and 
extinguishes itself as the grip is transformed into the stable holding behaviour of MRHH. 
 
21 CA: TOUCH – Right Hand Grip (TRHG) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
TRHG 5 1 3 2 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.3 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Grip (CRHG) 
 OUTPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Grip (CRHG) 
Negative feedback control here is crude in that as soon as this CA is ignited, along with its 
motor complement, it simply confirms that there is adequate, expected grip (e.g. the kettle 
handle is not damp and friction poor) and sends output to CRHG.  It is modelled as decaying 
slowly (IgTEx – D50% = 0.4 seconds) in case of early “gripping errors”. 
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22 CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Hold (CRHH) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
CRHH 10 2 5 5 3.8 4.0 - - 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Grip (CRHG). 
   CA: MOTOR – Right Hand Hold (MRHH). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: MOTOR – Right Hand Hold (CRHH), 
   CA: COGNITIVE – Lift Kettle (CLK). 
Unusually in this highly practiced task, this CA is a fairly general one, hence its size (PotN 
10K). It has a low threshold (2K), strong relative ignition (5K) and effectively no fatigue. The 
CA continues ignited beyond the duration of this analysis. 
The experiential/introspective psychology, at least, is quite odd about holding objects as once 
they are held it seems we forget what we are holding.  As evidence, often one looks at one’s 
hand during a task to see just what is in it. Obviously different objects are treated differently, 
but it seems that once a hold is established, it is one or more CAs associated with the object, 
rather than the hold on it, which remain task relevant, i.e. ignited. 
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23 CA: MOTOR – Right Hand Hold (MRHH) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
MRHH 10 2 3 3 3.9 4.1 - - 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Hold (CRHH). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Hold (CRHH) 
Following CRHH, it just ignites, persists, and unless there is imperfect performance, e.g. the 
kettle over the drainer  “in flight” hits an obstruction, as a motor CA it causes a solid hold on 
the kettle handle, notwithstanding later orientations of the kettle itself. 
As discussed with CA 06 MSHWA (Motor Stride to Hot Water Area), the CA’s actual 
behaviour will be more complicated than as suggested by the flat line in its SCAM diagram.  
For example, while going over the drainer, or when decelerating over the right hand sink, then 
the hold might change; that the SCAM is over simplified at this stage of the research is not 
denied, it is only a start after all. 
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24 CA: COGNITIVE – LIFT KETTLE (CLK) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
CLK 10 3 6 5 4.0 4.2 4.7 4.8 
 
 INPUTS:  CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Hold (CRHH), 
   CA: VISUAL – Lift Kettle (VLK) 
CA: KINAESTHETIC – Kettle Weight (KKW). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: VISUAL -  Lift Kettle (VLK) 
CA: MOTOR – Lift Kettle (MLK), 
   CA: KINAESTHETIC – Kettle Weight (KKW), 
   CA: COGNITIVE – Drainer (CD), 
   CA: COGNITIVE – Move Kettle to Sink (CMKS). 
The ergonomics and CA perspective agree that a new subtask starts here, but within the SCAM 
model the line is blurred in that some CAs are already ignited and will persist beyond the 
duration of this analysis (CRHH and MRHH). 
Empty, the kettle weighs 1.7Kg and if previously boiled water remains in it, it may weigh a 
third more (e.g. with about a pint/half litre: 2.3Kg/1.7Kg = 1.35).  The initial vertical lift of the 
kettle from its base (it must be vertical because the base has a central, circular hub that the 
kettle locates on) critically signals the kettle’s weight via kinaesthetic feedback (KKW).  There 
is visual tracking of the kettle (VLK).  The CA is well primed (P50% - IgTIg = 0.2 seconds) 
and it persists for longer than the motor behaviour (MLK) because it must ignite both cognitive 
CAs for the sub-task’s continuation (CD and CMKS). 
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25 CA: MOTOR – Lift Kettle (MLK) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
MLK 5 1 3 2 4.1 4.3 4.4 4.5 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Lift Kettle (CLK). 
 OUTPUTS: motor behaviour … 
Well primed (P50% - IgTIg = 0.2 seconds) because this is a highly practiced task, and with a 
low threshold (PotN 5K, Threshold 1k), there is an initial ballistic lift which then comes under 
kinaesthetic negative feedback control from KKW, which adjusts the rate of the upwards lift, 
and then close behind this under visual negative feedback control (VLK) via CLK, which starts 
to orientate the kettle by turning the right wrist clockwise. 
The CA is not explicitly extinguished because it segues into the next motor operation, moving 
the kettle to the sink (MMKS), without a pause, but with a deceleration in the kettle’s post-lift 
trajectory, presumably so that the kettle’s path over the drainer can be determined. 
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26 CA: KINAESTHETIC –Kettle Weight (KKW) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
KKW 5 1 3 3 4.2 4.4 4.5 4.6 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Lift Kettle (CLK). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Lift Kettle (CLK) 
People have an expectation about the weight of objects before they touch them and this is easily 
demonstrated by the under- or over-lift people produce when such expectations are violated.  
While this kinaesthetic CA is undoubtedly used whenever objects are lifted, it is particularly 
germane here as the kettle gives no indication of how much water remains in it until it is lifted.  
The CA rarely has a conscious representation unless the kettle is unusually full, when, against 
general house policy, this signals poor energy conservation. 
The CA is small (PotN 5K) and easily ignited (Threshold 1K).  In this model the CA does not 
persist, i.e. the kettle’s weight is represented in CLK. 
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27 CA: VISUAL – Lift Kettle (VLK) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
VLK 10 3 6 5 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.7 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Lift Kettle (CLK). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Lift Kettle (CLK). 
The kettle comes more into view when it is lifted above the cluttered hot water area (it is 
initially also obscured by the right hand and forearm).  The CA takes over from KKW providing 
negative feedback to CLK and starts the control of angling the kettle to the right.  It is small 
for a visual CA (PotN 10K) as it involves object tracking and, under movement, a poor percept 
of the kettle itself. 
 
28 CA: COGNITIVE – Drainer (CD) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
CD 15 5 8 6 4.5 4.6 6.0 6.1 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Lift Kettle (CLK), 
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   CA: VISUAL – Drainer (VD). 
 OUTPUTS CA: VISUAL – Drainer (VD), 
CA: COGNITIVE – Move Kettle to Sink (CMKS). 
The steel wire drainer is the most variable object associated with the task because it may be 
empty or it could be full of washed objects. It is 50cm in depth and 32cm along the draining 
board, which is the length of the kettle’s path over this potential obstacle.  Empty, the drainer 
is 10cm high but the largest pot that is regularly used has a 28cm diameter and this pot’s lid, 
upright but at an angle in the plate rack, also has a maximum height of 28cm. 
This is quite a large CA (PotN 15K) to reflect the complexity of a variable object, although the 
critical information extracted by CMKS is the height at particular depths over which the kettle 
must pass. N.B. There are other CAs concerning the drainer that are used in other tasks, such 
as when washing up or when putting dried objects away.  The CA is ignited before CLK 
extinguishes and accepts the final, angled orientation of the kettle effected by CLK. 
 
29 CA: VISUAL – Drainer (VD) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
VD 25 8 15 13 4.6 4.7 5.5 5.8 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Drainer (CD). 
 OUTPUTS CA: COGNTIVE – Drainer (CD). 
The drainer’s visual CA is equivalently large (PotN 25K) to its cognitive CA (PotN 15K).  As 
explained below (CMKS), it does not directly feed the moving the kettle to the sink CA, except 
via CD.  It extinguishes quite early as visual attention switches to the kettle’s arrival over the 
sinks. 
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30 CA: COGNITIVE – Move Kettle to Sink (CMKS) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
CMKS 25 5 15 12 4.7 4.8 6.6 6.7 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Lift Kettle (CLK) 
   CA: COGNITIVE – Drainer (CD), 
   CA: VISUAL – Move Kettle to Sink (VMKS). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: VISUAL – Move Kettle to Sink (VMKS), 
   CA: MOTOR – Move Kettle to Sink (MMKS) 
CA: MOTOR – Left Hand Track Kettle Lid (MLHTKL) 
CA: KINAESTHETIC – Left Hand track Kettle Lid (KLHTKL),  
CA: MOTOR – Shuffle Body to Sink (MSBS), 
CA: COGNITIVE – Left Hand Remove Kettle Lid (CLHRKL). 
CA: COGNITIVE – Sink (CS). 
If the kettle were an aircraft, then it would be one with terrain following radar so as to maintain 
height-above-ground.  The kettle is flown over the drainer in a smooth path that varies in height, 
and to a lesser extent depth, depending on what, if anything, is in the drainer.  What does not 
happen is that the kettle is flown around the drainer and not over it as this would require a step 
to be taken back, away from the hot water area, whereas CMKS involves a shuffle to the right 
so that the body is closer to the sink. 
How much the kettle’s flight path is “calculated” in advance and how much is under visual 
negative feedback control is moot.  Performance is fast and, perhaps surprisingly, error free, 
i.e. objects on the drainer are never hit by the kettle even though it may be only a few 
centimetres above draining objects.  The subjective impression following detailed observation 
for this research is that perhaps one course correction is made mid-flight over the drainer and 
a second, once that is cleared, to bring the kettle above the main, right most sink. 
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The CA is large for a cognitive one (PotN 25K) and with a low threshold (5K) because its 
ignition continues the initial kettle lift (CLK).  The kettle’s weight information is transferred 
from CLK to CMKS.  At a lower level of analysis this CA  might be described by a number of 
interacting CAs, e.g. concerning open versus negative feedback control and the varying, three 
dimensional accelerations applied. 
 
31 CA: VISUAL – Move Kettle to Sink (VMKS) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
VMKS 15 5 10 9 4.8 4.9 6.5 6.6 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Move Kettle to Sink (CMKS). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Move Kettle to Sink (CMKS). 
Like the visual CA for lifting the kettle (VLK), this CA is quite small as it really only signals 
the base of the kettle over the drainer (PotN 15K) and then the general location of the kettle 
over the sink. 
As with CMKS, at a lower level of analysis this CA might be described by several, interacting 
ones. 
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32 CA: MOTOR – Move Kettle to Sink (MMKS) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
MMKS 20 5 10 9 4.9 5.0 6.5 6.6 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Move Kettle to Sink (CMKS). 
 OUTPUTS: motor behaviour … 
The complex motor behaviour is probably carried out by a single CA and illustrates the 
advantage of using a CA-based model rather a symbolic computational one, that CAs are 
capable of flexible learning.  The CA is modelled as having several general flight paths, e.g. 
for when the drainer is empty, has a few low height objects, or some big ones draining, and 
then adapts to specific conditions to quickly and safely fly over the draining board using visual 
negative feedback via CMKS. 
The CA is large for a motor one (PotN 20K) and perhaps only half these neurons will be 
involved in any particular ignition (IgMax 10K).  The CA is explicitly suppressed by CMKS 
when the kettle is over the main sink; the actual location need not be very precise as the sink is 
a large target relative to the kettle. 
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33 CA: MOTOR – Left Hand Track Kettle Lid (MLHTKL) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
MLHTKL 15 3 9 6 5.0 5.1 7.0 7.0 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Move Kettle to Sink (CMKS), 
   CA KINAESTHETIC – Left Hand Track Kettle Lid (KLHTKL). 
   CA: VISUAL – Visual Left Hand (VLH). 
   CA: COGNITIVE – Left Hand Remove Kettle Lid (CLHRKL). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: KINAESTHETIC – Left Hand Track Kettle Lid (KLHTKL). 
The left arm/hand has not so far featured in this task, being used for general balance.  Out of 
sight, the left hand is accelerated towards, and then tracks, the kettle’s lid so that the left hand 
is close to it when it appears (VLH). The left hand/wrist will commence to orientate to meet 
the kettle lid. 
The CA is quite large for a motor one (PotN 15K), although we model it as a single CA because 
the behaviour is continuous.  It has additional input once the left hand appears (VLH) and so 
there is then both kinaesthetic and visual negative feedback to control the final fractions of a 
second before the kettle lid handle is gripped, at which point this tracking CA is suppressed by 
CLHRKL.  Ignition and visual input comes from CMKS which probably also provides 
kinaesthetic input about the right hand’s location and movement as it grips the kettle. 
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34 CA: KINAESTHETIC – Left Hand Track Kettle Lid (KLHTKL) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
KLHTKL 10 2 6 5 5.1 5.2 7.8 7.8 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Move Kettle to Sink (CMKS), 
CA: MOTOR – Left Hand Track Kettle Lid (MLHTKL), 
CA: COGNITIVE – Left Hand Remove Kettle Lid (CLHRKL), 
CA: MOTOR – Replace Kettle Lid Left Hand (MRKLLH). 
 OUTPUTS:  CA: MOTOR – Left Hand Track Kettle Lid (MLHTKL), 
   CA: COGNITIVE – Left Hand remove Kettle Lid (CLHRKL), 
   CA: MOTOR – Replace Kettle Lid Left Hand (MRKLLH). 
There must be all sorts of kinaesthetic feedback involved in the left hand tracking the kettle lid, 
then touching and gripping it, before the lid is replaced (CRKLLH).  The CA is ignited by 
CMKS and provides negative feedback cycles to MLHTKL and other motor CAs: CLHRKL 
before CRKLLH.  Unlike MLHTKL, it is not supressed but decays away once motor inputs 
terminate. 
Kinaesthetic CAS are generally on the small side because of the quality of their output, but this 
one is quite large (PotN 10K) and with a low threshold (2K) and little decay (IgMax 6K, IgFat 
5K) because, persisting for over two seconds, fatiguing neurons will be replaced from those so 
far not used within PotN. 
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35 CA: MOTOR – Shuffle Body to Sink (MSBS) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
MSBS 10 5 7 6 5.1 5.3 6.9 7.0 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Move Kettle to Sink (CMKS). 
 OUTPUTS: motor behaviour … 
This may be a super-practiced task but the movement of the body from the hot water corner to 
the sink is ungainly and variable, and although irrelevant, the subject isn’t normally conscious 
of this behaviour.  The knees are close to the under sink cabinets so the move to the sink 
involves the hips and a sideways stretch of first the right and then the left foot and then some 
small foot corrections, although occasionally the final position is one where most of the body 
weight is on the right foot.  The shuffle may continue for some time after the kettle has reached 
the sink, i.e. in parallel with the next sub-task of removing the kettle’s lid. 
 
36 CA: COGNITIVE – Sink (CS) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
CS 5 2 4 3 6.5 6.7 - - 
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 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Move Kettle to Sink (CMKS), 
   CA: VISUAL – Sink (VS). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: VISUAL – Sink (VS), 
CA: COGNITIVE – Left Hand Remove Kettle Lid (CLHRKL). 
The sink here is the larger, rightmost of the pair and it is usually empty; if it is not empty then, 
like CKEC at the start of this analysis, other CAs would be ignited to assess the sink’s state 
and decide how to orientate the kettle so it can still be filled. 
Empty, the sink’s cognitive representation here need not be large (PotN 5K) as it is a large 
target relative to the kettle, which only needs to be centred above the sink so that it can be 
emptied. 
This CA and its associated CA (VS) are assumed to persist beyond the analysis as they provide, 
albeit perhaps weak, context information to the following CAs (not shown on the CAAR 
diagram, Figure 9). 
 
37 CA: VISUAL – Sink (VS) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
VS 10 5 7 6 6.6 6.8 - - 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE –Sink (CS). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Sink (CS). 
Made of brushed steel, the visual representation of the sink is fairly simple (PotN 10K) as it is 
relatively featureless and colourless (N.B. In the human visual system there would be many 
low spatial frequency components; and in computational terms standard compression 
algorithms of a photograph would be particularly effective). 
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38 CA: COGNITIVE – Left Hand Remove Kettle Lid (CLHRKL) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
CLHRKL 5 1 4 3 6.8 6.9 7.2 7.3 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Move Kettle to Sink (CMKS) 
   CA: COGNITIVE – Sink (CS), 
   CA: KINAESTHETIC – Left Hand Track Kettle Lid (KLHTKL), 
   CA: VISUAL – Kettle Lid (VKL) 
   CA: VISUAL – Left Hand (VLH), 
   CA: VISUAL – Kettle Without Lid (VKWL). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: KINAESTHETIC – Left Hand Track Kettle Lid (KLHTKL),  
CA: VISUAL – Kettle Lid (VKL) 
   CA: VISUAL – Left Hand (VLH), 
   CA: MOTOR – Left Hand Remove Kettle Lid (MLHRKL), 
   CA: VISUAL – Kettle Without Lid (VKWL), 
   CA: COGNITIVE – Empty Kettle (CEK). 
   CA: MOTOR – Left Hand Track Kettle Lid (MLHTKL). 
On the adage that the act of doing a TA improves, by method iteration (Section 1), even the 
earliest analysis stages, then this CA provides a good example.  Initially the subtask seemed 
remarkable for its speed (say a third of a second) and accuracy (it virtually never fails on the 
first attempt); it took careful, further observation for this research to be able to model it.  The 
initial problem was that the first analysis only included the left arm/hand once it came into 
operation to remove the kettle’s lid.  Further observation showed that the left hand was tracking 
the kettle’s lid soon after the kettle starts moving towards the sink (CMKS) and that the lid is 
closely tracked by the left hand (MLHTKL and KLHTKL) during its flight over the drainer. 
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Like the right hand approaching the kettle (CRHA), it must start with a ballistic movement as 
the left hand is not in view and then it must come under visual negative feedback control for 
the fingers to grip the kettle lid’s handle, which can be at any angle on top of the kettle, but this 
is far less variability than exists in the hot water area.   
This CA and its associates could be analysed in much greater detail than is provided at the level 
of analysis we’ve chosen.  In the analysis offered the CA is small (PotN 5K), with a low 
threshold (1K), and, being highly specialised, IgMax is proportionally high (4K).  In an 
alternative CAA this CA could be larger or, as we suspect, there are many component CAs that 
we have not modelled in our analysis. 
 
39 CA: VISUAL – Kettle Lid (VKL) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
VKL 10 5 7 6 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.2 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Left Hand Remove Kettle Lid (CLHRKL). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Left Hand Remove Kettle Lid (CLHRKL). 
The kettle lid is a black/dark grey plastic with an inverted dished top and a simple sold bar 
across this to act as the handle.  What the CA needs to represent is the angle of the handle and 
the three dimensional location of the lid on the top of the kettle; the latter is no doubt determined 
by binocular parallax (the different images in the eyes caused by the eyes’ horizontal 
separation).  It doesn’t need to be large for a visual CA (PotN 10K). 
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40 CA: VISUAL – Left Hand (VLH) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
VLH 10 5 7 6 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.2 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Left Hand Remove Kettle Lid (CLHRKL). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Left Hand Remove Kettle Lid (CLHRKL). 
This doesn’t need to be a big visual CA (PotN 10K) as its purpose is only for control of the left 
hand’s final approach to the kettle’s lid.  It is also assumed, because of the speed and accuracy 
(see CLHRKL), that the CA is not that large. 
 
41 CA: MOTOR – Left Hand Remove Kettle Lid (MLHRKL) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
MLHRKL 7 2 6 5 7.0 7.1 7.7 7.7 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Left Hand Remove Kettle Lid (MLHRKL). 
 OUTPUTS: motor behaviour … 
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This is a snatch, hold and move away action which in this analysis is modelled by a single CA 
(PotN 7K) because, again, of the speed of the initial behaviour, although at a more detailed 
level it might be treated as compound behaviour involving several CAs.  On the other hand, a 
single CA, as here, seems equally plausible, with it smoothly combining the component 
behaviours.  The CA remains ignited, holding the lid away from the kettle, until the lid is 
replaced about half a second later (CRKLLH and MRKLLH). 
 
42 CA: VISUAL – Kettle Without Lid (VKWL) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
VKWL 10 5 7 6 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Left Hand Remove Kettle Lid (CLHRKL). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Left Hand Remove Kettle Lid (CLHRKL). 
This is a small (PotN 10K) visual CA that confirms the kettle’s lid is off.  It provides feedback 
to CLHRLK which then allows the ignition of CEK to empty the kettle.   
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43 CA: COGNITIVE – Empty Kettle (CEK) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
CEK 5 1 4 3 7.1 7.2 7.4 7.5 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Left Hand Remove Kettle Lid (CLHRKL), 
CA: VISUAL – Kettle Empty (VKE). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: MOTOR – Right Hand Invert Kettle (MRHIK), 
   CA: VISUAL – Kettle Empty (VKE) 
   CA: COGNITIVE – Kettle Empty (CKE). 
Residue water in the kettle is never re-boiled.  The kettle is emptied very rapidly by turning the 
kettle upside down; there is a brief physical delay as the water falls out.  Inverting the kettle, 
however, involves a single, fast right wrist rotation to the left.  The CA is small (PotN 5K) with 
a low threshold (1K). 
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44 CA: MOTOR – Right Hand Invert Kettle (MRHIK) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
MRHIK 3 1 2 2 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.4 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Empty Kettle (CEK). 
 OUTPUTS: motor behaviour … 
This is a really small CA (PotN 3K) as the right wrist is rotated to the left (anticlockwise) to its 
maximum extent.  Mostly it is open loop control, although there is probably kinaesthetic 
negative feedback control, which isn’t modelled in this analysis, and might involve the right 
elbow and shoulder which, starting to lift as the wrist rotation approaches its maximum, may 
contribute to the CA extinguishing.   
 
45 CA: VISUAL – Kettle Empty (VKE) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
VKE 10 3 5 5 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Empty Kettle (CEK). 
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 OUTPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE –Empty Kettle (CEK). 
The water falls out of the kettle in a lump; the splash remains within the sink; the critical thing 
for the CA is that the event has ended.  The CA ignites CKE via CEK. 
 
46 CA: COGNITIVE – Kettle Empty (CKE) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
CKE 3 1 2 2  7.4 7.5 7.6 7.6 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE –Empty Kettle (CEK). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Orientate Kettle (CRHOK). 
Primarily concerned with signally that the kettle is empty, rationally this CA ought to exist, but 
in the CAA described it really only functions as a place marker that ignites CRHOK.  An 
alternative CAA could equally plausible have CRHOK ignited by VKE.  It is modelled as a 
very small CA (PotN 3K) and transient, lasting 100ms or less. 
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47 CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Orientate Kettle (CRHOK) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
CRHOK 5 1 4 3 7.5 7.6 7.8 7.9 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Kettle Empty (CKE), 
   CA: VISUAL – Right Hand Orientate Kettle (VRHOK). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: VISUAL – Right Hand Orientate Kettle (VRHOK) 
   CA: MOTOR – Right Hand Orientate Kettle (MRHOK), 
   CA: COGNITIVE – Replace Kettle Lid with Left Hand (CRKLLH). 
This is the opposite of inverting the kettle (CRHIK) and involves a right wrist rotation of about 
100 degrees so that the kettle is returned to being upright and roughly angled towards the 
filtered water tap.  It is a small CA (PotN 5K) and visual negative feedback control (VRHOK) 
primarily concerns the end of the rotation and halting its motor CA (MRHOK) 
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48 CA: VISUAL – Right Hand Orientate Kettle (VRHOK) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
VRHOK 10 5 7 6 7.5 7.6 7.9 8.0 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Orientate Kettle (CRHOK). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Orientate Kettle (CRHOK). 
Since the previous visual target was the emptied, inverted kettle, then visual attention is already 
directed to the kettle.  The initial wrist rotation is fast but as it decelerates to a halt then this 
CA provides the final control that orientates the kettle and then leads to the suppression of 
MRHOK via CRHOK. 
 
49 CA: MOTOR – Right Hand Orientate Kettle (MRHOK) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
MRHOK 3 1 2 2 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Orientate Kettle (CRHOK). 
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 OUTPUTS: motor behaviour … 
A small motor CA (PotN 5K), it is ignited and then supressed by CRHOK.  Like MRHIK, there 
is probably kinaesthetic feedback which is not modelled here. 
 
50 CA: COGNITIVE – Replace Kettle Lid with Left Hand (CRKLLH) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
CRKLLH 8 3 6 5 7.8 7.9 8.2 8.3 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Right Hand Orientate Kettle (CRHOK), 
CA: VISUAL – Replace Kettle Lid with Left Hand (VRKLLH). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: VISUAL – Replace Kettle Lid with Left Hand (VRKLLH) 
   CA: MOTOR – Replace Kettle Lid with Left Hand (MRKLLH), 
   CA: COGNITIVE – Move Kettle to Tap (CMKT). 
The kettle is filled through its spout so its lid is replaced by the left hand before filling.  The 
lid has been held in roughly the correct position, slightly above the top of the kettle.  The lid is 
nearly always accurately inserted into the kettle in a single motion under visual negative 
feedback control.   
A slight wobble from the left wrists ensures the lid is correctly located in the final few tens of 
milliseconds.  Whatever kinaesthetic feedback from left, and right, hands is not modelled being 
too fast and at too low a level of detail.  In any case, bringing the hands together, with or without 
an intervening object, are expert skills everyone learns very early in life.  Similarly, we have 
not modelled audio inputs, but there is a “click” when the lid locates, although this is only 
noticeable in its absence, e.g. when the washing machine is making so much noise that such 
quiet noises cannot be detected. 
The CA ignites its motor component (MRKLLH) and then explicitly supresses it on 
confirmation that the lid is correctly in place. 
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51 CA: VISUAL – Replace Kettle Lid with Left Hand (VRKLLH) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
VRKLLH 10 5 7 6 7.8 7.9 8.2 8.3 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Replace Kettle Lid with Left Hand (CRKLLH). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Replace Kettle Lid with Left Hand (CRKLLH). 
This is a straightforward, short distance, tracking task for the visual system.  It’s part of the 
vast suite of potential CAs involved with manipulating objects with our hands. 
 
52 CA: MOTOR – Replace Kettle Lid with Left Hand (MRKLLH) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
MRKLLH 10 3 7 6 7.9 8.0 8.1 8.2 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Replace Kettle Lid with Left Hand (CRKLLH), 
CA: KINAESTHETIC – Left Hand Track Kettle Lid (KLHTKL). 
OUTPUTS: CA: KINAESTHETIC – Left Hand Track Kettle Lid (KLHTKL). 
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Ignited by CRKLLH it is then supressed by it once the kettle’s lid is located. Once ignited it 
establishes a negative feedback loop with KLHTKL.  The CA has three motor components: the 
movement to the kettle; a wobble to locate the lid securely; and the final operation is to move 
the left hand away and leave it hovering before the next behaviour, moving the left hand to 
operate the filter water tap’s switch.  Thus, the CA is relatively large (PotN 10K). 
 
53 CA: COGNITIVE – Move Kettle to Tap (CMKT) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
CMKT 15 5 10 9 8.1 8.2 - - 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Replace Kettle Lid with Left Hand (CRKLLH), 
   CA: VISUAL – Tap (VT) 
   CA: VISUAL – Kettle (VK). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: VISUAL – Tap (VT) 
   CA: VISUAL – Kettle (VK), 
   CA: MOTOR – Move Kettle to Tap (MMKT). 
   CA: MOTOR – Hold Kettle to Tap (MHKT), 
   CA: COGNITIVE – Move Left Hand to Tap Switch (CMLHTS) 
While similar to moving the kettle to the sink (CMKS), the flight path here is only short, say 
15cm, and unobstructed given the sink’s usual, empty state.  It is a complex behaviour in that 
the kettle needs some small, careful rotations under visual negative feedback control so that 
the kettle’s spout is accurately located directly under the water filter’s spout, preferably without 
the two touching. Hence a PotN of 15K. 
The CAs final operation is to supress the movement of the kettle (MMKT) and to hold the 
kettle still (MHKT) while the kettle is being filled.  It ignites CMLHTS to move the left hand 
to the filtered water’s tap switch. 
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54 CA: VISUAL – Tap (VT) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
VT 10 3 5 5 8.2 8.3 8.6 8.7 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Move Kettle to Tap (CMKT). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Move Kettle to Tap (CMKT). 
The filtered water tap consists of a tubular spout that rises beside the sink and turns 180 degrees 
vertically so that water flows down into the far right  corner of the sink; the tap and spout are 
in a fixed position that does not change.  Such invariance, unlike even in the hot water area, 
means that a large visual CA is not necessary (PotN 10K). 
 
55 CA: VISUAL – Kettle (VK) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
VK 15 5 8 7 8.2 8.3 - - 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Move Kettle to Tap (CMKT). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Move Kettle to Tap (CMKT). 
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Visual attention is primarily on the kettle’s spout and its three dimensional location with respect 
to the fixed location of the filtered water’s spout, which is a small silver coloured target against 
a similarly coloured background, the sink.  Visually fiddly but highly practiced, it has a PotN 
of 15K. 
 
56 CA: MOTOR – Move Kettle to Tap (MMKT) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
MMKT 15 5 10 8 8.3 8.4 8.6 8.6 
 
INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Move Kettle to Tap (CMKT). 
OUTPUTS: motor behaviours … 
Involving hand, wrist and arm movement is relatively complex and requires accuracy if the 
kettle and tap spouts are not to make contact (PotN 15K).  It is ignited by CMKT and then 
extinguished by CMKT so that the kettle can be held in its final, filling location (MKHT). 
 
57 CA: MOTOR – Hold Kettle to Tap (MHKT) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
MHKT 6 1 3 3 8.4 8.5 - - 
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INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Move Kettle to Tap (CMKT). 
OUTPUTS: motor behaviours … 
This is a small CA (PotN 6K) that is of a stationary class involving maintaining the position of 
an object. It is easily ignited (Threshold 1K) and can maintain itself indefinitely, i.e. neurons 
firing as other fatigue, indeed, the muscle fibres similarly fatigue and rotate contraction 
amongst themselves. 
 
58 CA: COGNITIVE – Move Left Hand to Tap Switch (CMLHTS) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
CMLHTS 15 7 10 8 8.3 8.5 8.9 9.0 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Move Kettle to Tap (CMKT), 
   CA: VISUAL – Left Hand to Tap Switch (VLHTS) 
CA: VISUAL – Tap Switch (VTS), 
CA: TOUCH – Left Hand on Tap Switch (TLHTS). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: VISUAL – Left Hand to Tap Switch (VLHTS) 
CA: VISUAL – Tap Switch (VTS), 
CA: MOTOR – Move Left Hand to Tap Switch (MMLHTS) 
CA: TOUCH – Left Hand on Tap Switch (TLHTS), 
CA: COGNITIVE: Fill Kettle (CFK). 
The left hand has been hovering, waiting for the kettle to start to move towards the filtered 
water tap (CMKT).  The hand loosely follows behind the top of the kettle and then the elbow 
and wrist have to make adjustments for the left hand’s awkward reach behind the tap to the 
tap’s switch.  It’s quite a large cognitive CA (PotN 15K) to reflect the movement’s complexity 
87 
 
and has a high threshold (7K) to reflect the variability of when the CA ignites and the reaching 
behaviour starts (IgTIg – P50% = 0.2 seconds, i.e. perhaps nearly half a second of priming). 
With detailed observation it seems about 10% of the time the left hand takes an alternative 
route, in between the tap and the kettle, rather than behind both, and this seems to be determined 
by how close are objects behind the tap switch (an area used to stack things waiting to be 
washed-up) that might interfere with the left fingers.  Thus, a decision is made early on by this 
CA as to which path the left hand will follow. 
 
59 CA: VISUAL – Left Hand to Tap Switch (VLHTS) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
VLHTS 20 5 10 7 8.5 8.6 - - 
 
 INPUTS: COGNITIVE – Move Left Hand to Tap Switch (CMLHTS). 
 OUTPUTS: COGNITIVE – Move Left Hand to Tap Switch (CMLHTS). 
The CA is larger than one might initially expect (PotN 20K) because of the awkwardness of 
the movement, first tracking the kettle top and then providing feedback to control adjusting the 
hand to reach behind the tap to the switch.  
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60 CA: VISUAL – Tap Switch (VTS) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
VTS 10 5 7 6 8.6 8.7 - - 
 
INPUTS: COGNITIVE – Move Left Hand to Tap Switch (CMLHTS). 
 OUTPUTS: COGNITIVE – Move left Hand to Tap switch (CMLHTS). 
The invariance of the filtered water tap’s location means that this is small for a visual CA (PotN 
10K).  Indeed, while this CA rationally needs to exist, one might suggest that its effect on 
behaviour is limited and perhaps, if the tap switch were absent (broken off), then CMLHTS 
and MMLTS would still ignite and the hand reach the switch before its absence was discovered, 
perhaps even discovered kinaesthetically (TLHTS). 
 
61 CA: MOTOR – Move Left Hand to Tap Switch (MMLHTS) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
MMLHTS 15 5 8 7 8.7 8.7 8.9 9.0 
 
 INPUTS: COGNITIVE – Move Left Hand to tap Switch (CMLHTS). 
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 OUTPUTS: motor behaviour … 
With a PotN of 15K, this is a relatively large motor CA to reflect the compound nature of the 
behaviour.  At a lower level of analysis this CA might be broken into several tightly bound 
ones, although some CAA models might still prefer a single CA as used here.  It is ignited and 
then extinguished by CMLHTS. The latter based on touch feedback (TLHTS). 
 
62 CA: TOUCH –Left Hand on Tap Switch (TLHTS) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
TLHTS 8 2 6 5 8.7 8.8 - - 
 
INPUTS: COGNITIVE – Move Left Hand to Tap Switch (CMLHTS). 
 OUTPUTS: COGNITIVE – Move left Hand to Tap switch (CMLHTS). 
The left hand’s final approach behind the tap switch target might be described as a fumble; 
whether it’s the first two or the middle pair of fingers which come to rest under the switch 
appears to vary across task performances.  An alternative description is that this CA is one of 
a common class of small ones (here PotN = 8K) that are used in fixed environments, are highly 
practiced, and use only limited visual feedback for approximate control, instead relying on a 
final fumble and negative feedback from touching the target object (putting one’s coffee mug 
down on one’s desk while still looking at the computer screen might be a particularly common 
example). 
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63 CA: COGNITIVE – Fill Kettle (CFK) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
CFK  10 3 7 6 8.8 8.9 - - 
 
 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Move Left Hand to Tap Switch (CMLHTS). 
 OUTPUTS: CA: MOTOR – Pull Tap Switch Up (MPTSU), 
   CA: COGNITIVE – Make Coffee (CMC). 
Ignition of this CA starts the first of three long pauses in the making a mug of coffee task; the 
other, longer two, are (1) boiling the kettle; and (2) waiting for the coffee to filter into the mug.  
It doesn’t have to be a large CA (PotN 10K) as it needs only to ignite MPTSU to start the kettle 
filling process and then to reignite CMC.   
 
64 CA: MOTOR – Pull Tap Switch Up (MPTSU) 
 
ID PotN Thresh IgMax IgFat P50% IgTIg IgTEx D50% 
MPTSU 5 1 3 3 8.9 9.0 - - 
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 INPUTS: CA: COGNITIVE – Fill Kettle (CFK) 
This involves a simple flick of the fingers upwards under open loop control (PotN 5K).  After 
this flick the left hand may or may not be removed from the tap switch, immediately or at some 
later time during the filling process; this depends on other mental activities during the filling 
time. 
 
03 CA: Cognitive – Make Coffee (CMC) … 
This is the end of the ‘First Steps to Making Coffee’ analysis.  At this point there remains ten 
ignited CAs: 
CRHH & MRHH  – The right hand is holding the kettle by its handle. 
CS & VS   – The sink is still a major feature of the task environment. 
CMKT & MHKT  – The kettle is held to the tap as the kettle fills. 
VK   – The kettle remains a major object in the task environment. 
TLHTS, CFK & MPTSU – The left hand may make a variety of movements, including 
none, after the end of the analysis period. 
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Acronym Glossary  
CAs (in order of analysis appearance) 
01 CKEC COGNITIVE – Kitchen Entrance Check (CKEC) 
02 VKEG VISUAL – Kitchen Entrance General (VKEG) 
03 CMC COGNITIVE – Make Coffee (CMC) 
04 CAHWA COGNITIVE – Approaching Hot Water Area (CAHWA)  
05 VAHWA VISUAL – Approaching Hot Water Area (VAHWA) 
06 MSHWA MOTOR – Stride To Hot Water Area (MSHWA) 
07 CKHWA COGNITIVE – Kettle In Hot Water Area (CKHWA) 
08 VKHWA VISUAL – Kettle In Hot Water Area (VKHWA) 
09 CKH COGNITIVE – Kettle Handle (CKH) 
10 VKH VISUAL – Kettle Handle (VKH) 
11 MRAB MOTOR – Right Arm Ballistic (MRAB) 
12 VRH VISUAL – Right hand (VRH) 
13 CRH COGNITIVE – Right hand (CRH) 
14 CHWA COGNITIVE – Hot water Area (CHWA) 
15 VHWA VISUAL – Hot Water Area  
16 CRHA COGNITIVE – Right Hand Approach (CRHA) 
17 VRHA VISUAL – Right Hand Approach (VRHA) 
18 MRHA MOTOR – Right Hand Approach (MRHA) 
19 TRHKH TOUCH – Right Hand to Kettle Handle (TRHKH) 
20 CRHG COGNITIVE – Right Hand Grip (CRHG) 
21 MRHG MOTOR – Right Hand Grip (MRHG) 
22 TRHG TOUCH – Right Hand Grip (TRHG) 
23 CRHH COGNITIVE – Right Hand Hold (CRHH) 
24 MRHH MOTOR – Right Hand Hold (MRHH) 
25 CLK COGNITIVE – Lift Kettle (CLK) 
26 MLK MOTOR – Lift Kettle (MLK) 
27 KKW KINAESTHETIC –Kettle Weight (KKW) 
28 VLK VISUAL – Lift Kettle (VLK) 
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29 CD  COGNITIVE – Drainer (CD) 
30 VD  VISUAL – Drainer (VD) 
31 CMKS COGNITIVE – Move Kettle to Sink (CMKS) 
32 VMKS VISUAL – Move Kettle to Sink (VMKS) 
33 MMKS MOTOR – Move Kettle to Sink (MMKS) 
34 MLHTKL MOTOR – Left Hand Track Kettle Lid (KLHTKL) 
35 KLHTKL KINAESTHETIC – Left Hand Track Kettle Lid (KLHTKL) 
36 MSBS MOTOR – Shuffle Body to Sink (MSBS) 
37 CS  COGNITIVE – Sink (CS) 
38 VS  VISUAL – Sink (VS) 
39 CLHRKL COGNITIVE – Left Hand Remove Kettle Lid (CLHRKL) 
40 VKL VISUAL – Kettle Lid (VKL) 
41 VLH VISUAL – Left Hand (VLH) 
42 MLHRKL MOTOR – Left Hand Remove Kettle Lid (MLHRKL) 
43 VKWL VISUAL – Kettle Without Lid (VKWL) 
44 CEK COGNITIVE – Empty Kettle (CEK) 
45 MRHIK MOTOR – Right Hand Invert Kettle (MRHIK) 
46 VKE VISUAL – Kettle Empty (VKE) 
47 CKE COGNITIVE – Kettle Empty (CKE) 
48 CRHOK COGNITIVE – Right Hand Orientate Kettle (CRHOK) 
49 VRHOK VISUAL – Right Hand Orientate Kettle (VRHOK) 
50 MRHOK MOTOR – Right Hand Orientate Kettle (MRHOK) 
51 CRKLLH COGNITIVE – Replace Kettle Lid with Left Hand (CRKLLH) 
52 VRKLLH VISUAL – Replace Kettle Lid with Left Hand (VRKLLH) 
53 MRKLLH MOTOR – Replace Kettle Lid with Left Hand (MRKLLH) 
54 CMKT COGNITIVE – Move Kettle to Tap (CMKT) 
55 VT  VISUAL – Tap (VT) 
56 VK  VISUAL – Kettle (VK) 
57 MMKT MOTOR – Move Kettle to Tap (MMKT) 
58 MHKT MOTOR – Hold Kettle to Tap (MHKT) 
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59 CMLHTS COGNITIVE – Move Left Hand to Tap Switch (CMLHTS) 
60 VLHTS VISUAL – Left Hand to Tap Switch (VLHTS) 
61 VTS VISUAL – Tap Switch (VTS) 
62 MMLHTS MOTOR – Move Left Hand to Tap Switch (MMLHTS) 
63 TLHTS TOUCH – Left Hand on Tap Switch (TLHTS) 
64 CFK COGNITIVE – Fill Kettle (CFK) 
65 MPTSU MOTOR – Pull Tap Switch Up (MPTSU) 
03 CMC… COGNTIVE – Make Coffee (CMC) 
 
Other 
ACT-R Active Control of Thought – R version 
AI  Artificial Intelligence 
AL  Activity List 
ANN  Artificial Neural Network 
CA  Cell Assembly 
CAA  Cell Assembly Architecture 
CAAR  Cell Assembly Architecture Relationship  
CABot  Cell Assembly roBot 
EPIC  Executive-Process/Interactive Control 
FLIF  Fatiguing Leaky Integrate and Fire  
GOMS  Goals, Operators, Methods and Selection-rules 
HTA  Hierarchical Task Analysis 
LTM  Long Term Memory 
NL  Natural Language 
QPID  Quiescent, Priming, Ignition and Decay 
SCAM  Simplified Cell Assembly Model 
STM  Short Term Memory  
TA  Task Analysis 
TACAP Task Analysis Cell Assembly Perspective 
 
